CA/Browser Forum

Server Certificate Working Group Ballots

Ballots by Status

Voting Period

There are no ballots with the status "Voting Period" in the Server Certificate Working Group

IPR Review Period

  • SC098: Process RFC 8657 CAA Parameters (Wayne)

Discussion Period

  • SC087v2: Registration Number Improvement for EV Certificates

Draft / Under Consideration

  • SC087: Registration Number Improvement for EV Certificates

There are no ballots with the status "Pre-Ballot" in the Server Certificate Working Group

Passed

  • SC099: Improve Recording of Validation Method
  • SC095v3: Clean-up 2025
  • SC097: Sunset all remaining use of SHA-1 signatures in Certificates and CRLs
  • SC096: Carve-out for DNSSEC verification logging requirements
  • SC094v2: DNSSEC exception in email DCV methods
  • SC090: Gradually sunset all remaining email-based, phone-based, and ‘crossover’ validation methods from Sections 3.2.2.4 and 3.2.2.5
  • SC091: Sunset 3.2.2.5.3 Reverse Address Lookup Validation, proposal of new DNS-based validation using Persistent DCV TXT Record for IP addresses
  • SC088v3: DNS TXT Record with Persistent Value DCV Method
  • SC092: Sunset use of Precertificate Signing CAs
  • SC089: Mass Revocation Planning
  • SC086v3: Sunset the Inclusion of IP Reverse Address Domain Names
  • SC081v3: Introduce Schedule of Reducing Validity and Data Reuse Periods
  • SC085: Require DNSSEC for CAA and DCV Lookups
  • SC084: DNS Labeled with ACME Account ID Validation Method
  • SC083: Winter 2024-2025 Cleanup Ballot
  • SC080v3: Sunset the use of WHOIS to identify Domain Contacts and relying DCV Methods
  • SC079v2: Allow more than one Certificate Policy in a Cross-Certified Subordinate CA Certificate
  • SC076v2: Clarify and Improve OCSP Requirements
  • SC078: Subject organizationName alignment for DBA / Assumed Name
  • SC077: Update WebTrust Audit name in Section 8.4 and References
  • SC075: Pre-sign linting
  • SC073: Compromised and Weak Keys
  • SC068: Allow VATEL and VATXI for organizationIdentifier
  • SC067: Require Multi-Perspective Issuance Corroboration
  • SC069: Clarify router and firewall logging requirements
  • SC065: Convert EVGs into RFC3647 format
  • SC063: Make OCSP optional, require CRLs and incentivize automation
  • SC064: Temporary Moratorium on New Certificate Consumer Memberships
  • SC066v4: Fall 2023 clean-up
  • SC062: Certificate profiles update
  • SC061: New CRL Entries must have a Revocation Reason Code
  • SC058: require distributionPoint in sharded CRLs
  • SC056: 2022 Cleanup

Cancelled

  • SC095: Clean-up 2025
  • SC088v2: DNS TXT Record with Persistent Value DCV Method
  • SC071: Subscriber Agreement and Terms of Use Consolidation
  • SC076: Clarify and Improve OCSP Requirements

Failed

  • SC082: Clarify CA Assisted DNS Validation under 3.2.2.4.7
  • SC074: Clarify CP/CPS structure according to RFC 3647
  • SC070: Clarify the use of DTPs for Domain Control Validation
  • SC059: Weak key guidance
  • SC060: Membership of ZT Browser

Information about Ballots

Latest releases
Server Certificate Requirements
SC099: Improve Recording of Validation Methods - May 19, 2026

Code Signing Requirements
v3.8 - Aug 5, 2024

What’s Changed CSC-25: Import EV Guidelines to CS Baseline Requirements by @dzacharo in https://github.com/cabforum/code-signing/pull/38 Full Changelog: https://github.com/cabforum/code-signing/compare/v3.7...v3.8

S/MIME Requirements
v1.0.14 - Ballot SMC016 - May 5, 2026

This ballot maintains consistency between the S/MIME Baseline Requirements and the TLS Baseline Requirements with changes introduced by Ballots SC096 and SC097. Specifically, this ballot: Creates a carve-out of the logging requirements for DNSSEC specifically, stating these are not in scope. For audit purposes, change management logging is able to confirm if the appropriate controls are in effect or not. Sunsets all remaining use of SHA-1 signatures in Certificates and CRLs. It is noted that most uses of SHA-1 signatures are already deprecated by SC097. With this ballot, all unexpired Subordinate CA Certificates issuing S/MIME containing the SHA-1 signature algorithm must be revoked. This proposal does not prohibit the use of SHA-1 to generate issuerKeyHash or issuerNameHash values as currently required by RFC 5019. Includes minor formatting corrections.

Network and Certificate System Security Requirements
Version 2.0.5 (Ballot NS-008) - Jul 9, 2025

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The Certification Authority Browser Forum (CA/Browser Forum) is a voluntary gathering of Certificate Issuers and suppliers of Internet browser software and other applications that use certificates (Certificate Consumers).