



**ISARA**

# An Update on Post Quantum Cryptography

Mike Brown, CTO & Co-founder,  
ISARA Corporation



Founded | 2015

Headquarters | Waterloo, Ontario, Canada

Initial Funding from Quantum Valley Investments | \$11.5M

Series A from Shasta Ventures | \$10M

Canadian Government Strategic Funding (April 2019) | \$5.5M

Full-time employees | 33 (9 PhDs)

### Visionary Leadership Team

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Combined **150+** years  
experience and  
extensive global business  
experience and  
networks.

### Master Practitioners, Quantum-safe Experts

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Specialize in  
**quantum-safe** crypto.  
Deep knowledge of  
**lightweight crypto** for IoT.

### Standards-based Approach

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Collaboratively setting  
standards with **ETSI, ITU-T,**  
**X9, IETF, and NIST.**

# WHAT IS QUANTUM COMPUTING?

Quantum computing harnesses the unique properties of quantum physics to break barriers currently limiting the speed of today's "classical" computers, as they're now called.

Quantum computing **will not replace** current computers; you won't have a quantum computer smartphone in your pocket.

They will, however, be able to **solve very specific, hard problems** that even the fastest supercomputers couldn't solve in a reasonable amount of time today.

The first real use for them will likely be in advancements in areas such as material design, pharmaceuticals, and optimizing the power grid.



Major  
Industry Players

Google

intel


IBM

rigetti

# THE QUANTUM RACE IS ON



# POSITIVE DISRUPTIONS



**MATERIAL DESIGN**



**CHEMICAL DISCOVERY**



**DRUG DESIGN**



**OPTIMIZATION**



**SEARCH/ BIG DATA**



**MACHINE LEARNING**

# Timeline to Quantum



ANALOG QC



NOISY QC




UNIVERSAL QC

# The Quantum Effect on Public Key Cryptography

Type	Algorithm	Key Strength Classic (bits)	Key Strength Quantum (bits)	Quantum Attack
Asymmetric	RSA 2048	112	0	Shor's Algorithm
	RSA 3072	128		
	ECC 256	128		
	ECC 521	256		
Symmetric	AES 128	128	64	Grover's Algorithm
	AES 256	256	128	

# MITIGATING AN UNPRECEDENTED THREAT



Today, data breaches occur outside of cryptography, and the costs of those breaches is **growing**.

A complete break of public key cryptography is **unprecedented**.

In our connected world, everything that **protects data, authorizes or authenticates must be updated** to be quantum-safe.

This magnitude of change has never been required **on such a large scale**.





**IBM**  
= Less than  
20 years

**ETSI**  
= Less  
than  
10 years

**NIST**  
= Less than  
11 years

**Microsoft**  
= Less than  
11 years

**European  
Commission**  
= Sometime  
after 2025

The dawn of large-scale  
quantum computers

By 2026, the risk becomes  
too high to ignore

# The best time to start is now

**How many years does the connected device need to be secured for?**


If 7+ years, you need to start preparing today

**How long does the information need to remain confidential?**

If 7+ years, you need to start preparing today

**Does the device require strong security?**

- PKI and digital certificates
- Hardware security modules (HSMs)
- Physically embedded roots of trust



\*Mosca, Michele., Institute for Quantum Computing. 2015. "Cybersecurity in an era with quantum computers: will we be ready?". <https://eprint.iacr.org/2015/1075.pdf>


\*NIST. April 2016. "Report on Post-Quantum Cryptography". <http://dx.doi.org/10.6028/NIST.IR.8105>

\*<https://www.popsci.com/environment/article/2009-06/next-grid>

# TWO PATHS TO QUANTUM-SAFE SECURITY



Quantum Key  
Distribution




Quantum-Safe  
Cryptography

# THE "NEW" MATH



Hash-based

Ready to Use Today



Code-based


Undergoing NIST Evaluation



Lattice-based



Multivariate-based




Isogeny-based




# THE MIGRATION CHALLENGE

## KEY ESTABLISHMENT VS. AUTHENTICATION




Key establishment can be **easily upgraded** because the client and server negotiate which algorithm to use.

- 1) Use quantum-safe **key transport** or **key agreement** algorithms
- 2) Use **hybrid keys**, a mix of both classic and quantum-safe algorithms



The **complexity and interconnectivity** of public key infrastructure demands action today in order to be ready for the quantum age, and difficult to do while maintaining backward compatibility.

# DoD PKI MIGRATION EXAMPLE



There's more than **4.5 million active users** in the DoD identity management system.


Creating a quantum-safe duplicate infrastructure is time-consuming and cost prohibitive.

# Bridging the Gap Using Crypto-Agility



# HYBRID PKI & PHASED MIGRATION


- Hybrid Root certificates can be created today and embedded into systems today
- Stateful hash-based signatures are perfectly suited for certificate signing and are ready to be used today
- Code signing end systems can also be upgraded today
- Communication systems are ready to be upgraded to use hybrid algorithms or leading NIST candidates






# PKI MIGRATION APPROACHES

## Duplicate Infrastructure



## Hybrid Infrastructure



# Hybrid and Standards

- ITU-T

- A contribution submitted by ISARA Corporation (Canada) was approved that proposes the inclusion of optional support for multiple public-key algorithms in **Recommendation ITU-T X509 | ISO/IEC 9594-8**

- IETF

- Two proposals
  - “*Composite*” – IETF draft **Composite Public Keys and Signatures** (*draft-pala-composite-crypto*)
  - “*Catalyst*” - IETF draft **Multiple Public-Key Algorithm X.509 Certificates** (*draft-truskovsky-lamps-pq-hybrid-x509*)
- Both expired

# HIGH RISK: Authenticated Software Over-The-Air (OTA) Updates

## What's at risk?

Durable connected devices (IoT) with long in-field lives




## What's The Attack

Forged software updates by quantum-enabled adversaries




## What's Affected



**Protection: Physically embed stateful hash-based roots of trust today**

# Hash-Based Cryptography 101

- Introduced by Merkle in 1979
- “One-Time Signatures”
- Small public key but very large private key
- Fast signing & verifying
- Stateful
- Candidates:
  - Leighton-Micali Signatures (LMS)
  - eXtended Merkle Signature Scheme (XMSS)
  - SPHINCS



# NIST on Stateful Hash-based Signatures (HBS)

1. HBS schemes are good candidates for early standardization because they're **trusted, mature, and well understood**
2. NIST is actively reviewing **XMSS and LMS** (HSS) for early approval outside their Post-Quantum Cryptography Standardization Process
3. Under consideration for specific use-cases, such as **code-signing**
4. The security of an HBS scheme **relies on the same basis** as many current NIST-approved cryptographic algorithms and protocols, and no known quantum algorithms pose a practical threat

The screenshot shows the NIST CSRC website page for "Stateful Hash-Based Signatures". The page is titled "Stateful Hash-Based Signatures" and includes a "Project Overview" section. The overview text states: "NIST plans to approve one or more schemes for stateful hash-based signatures (HBS) as part of the post-quantum cryptography development effort. NIST is actively considering two such schemes developed through the Internet Engineering Task Force: 1) XMSS, specified in Request for Comments (RFC) 8931 in May 2018, and 2) LMS, currently specified in draft." The "Background" section explains that HBS schemes were the topic of a session during the first public workshop on post-quantum security, and that NIST established a sub-project for approving stateful HBS schemes because they don't meet the API requested for signatures and require state management. The page also lists public comments received on February 4, 2019, and June 21, 2018. The footer of the page includes the NIST logo and social media icons.

<https://csrc.nist.gov/Projects/Stateful-Hash-Based-Signatures>

# Stateful HBS Operational Implications

1. **Running out of keys:** The private key of a stateful HBS scheme is an “exhaustible” resource, so careful planning is required
2. **Growing signatures:** Signature size grows as the size of the private key grows
3. **New implementation considerations:** Private key splitting and state management is not something the industry has had to deal with before
4. **Special considerations for high-value roots:** For extremely high-value root keys that don't produce many signatures during their validity a manual process for state management may be required

# Global Standards Focus



# NIST Standardization Update

- 17 KEM Candidates

- BIKE
- Classic McEliece
- Kyber
- Frodo
- HQC
- LAC
- LEDAcrypt
- NewHope
- NTRU
- NTRU Prime
- NTS-KEM
- ROLLO
- Round5
- RQC
- SABER
- SIKE
- Three Bears

- 9 Signature Candidates

- Dilithium
- Falcon
- GeMSS
- LUOV
- MQDSS
- Picnic
- qTESLA
- Rainbow
- SPHINCS+



# NIST Standardization Update

- Timelines
  - Round 2 ends June 2020
  - Round 3 begins after with reduced list
  - Final standards 2022-2024(ish)
  - Potential additional algorithms standardized post Round 3
- Request more merging
- Hybrid modes of operation
- Complexity of implementation

We leverage decades of real-world cybersecurity expertise to protect today's computing ecosystems in the quantum age using practical, standardized technologies for a seamless migration.



**CLEARING THE PATH TO QUANTUM-SAFE SECURITY**

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