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Object Registry

Object Registry of the CA / Browser Forum

The CA/Browser Forum node (assigned organization identifier) is: 2.23.140

{joint-iso-itu-t(2) international-organizations(23) ca-browser-forum(140)}

Here are the CA/B Forum-assigned Object Identifiers (OIDs):

  • certificate-policies(1)
  • extended-validation(1) — 2.23.140.1.1  (Certificate issued in compliance with the Extended Validation Guidelines)
  • baseline-requirements(2) — 2.23.140.1.2 (TLS Baseline Requirements)
  • domain-validated(1) — 2.23.140.1.2.1 (Certificate issued in compliance with the TLS Baseline Requirements – No entity identity asserted)
  • organization-validated(2) — 2.23.140.1.2.2 (Certificate issued in compliance with the TLS Baseline Requirements – Organization identity asserted)
  • individual-validated(3) — 2.23.140.1.2.3 (Certificate issued in compliance with the TLS Baseline Requirements – Individual identity asserted)
  • extended-validation-codesigning(3) — 2.23.140.1.3 (EV Code Signing Certificate issued in compliance with the Code Signing Baseline Requirements)
  • codesigning-requirements(4) codesigning(1) — 2.23.140.1.4.1 (Code Signing Certificate issued in compliance with the Code Signing Baseline Requirements)
  • codesigning-requirements(4) timestamping(2) — 2.23.140.1.4.2 (Timestamp Certificate issued in compliance with the Code Signing Baseline Requirements)
  • smime(5) — 2.23.140.1.5 (S/MIME Baseline Requirements)
  • mailbox-validated (1) legacy (1) — 2.23.140.1.5.1.1
  • mailbox-validated (1) multipurpose (2) — 2.23.140.1.5.1.2
  • mailbox-validated (1) strict (3) — 2.23.140.1.5.1.3
  • organization-validated (2) legacy (1) — 2.23.140.1.5.2.1
  • organization-validated (2) multipurpose (2) — 2.23.140.1.5.2.2
  • organization-validated (2) strict (3) — 2.23.140.1.5.2.3
  • sponsor-validated (3) legacy (1) — 2.23.140.1.5.3.1
  • sponsor-validated (3) multipurpose (2) — 2.23.140.1.5.3.2
  • sponsor-validated (3) strict (3) — 2.23.140.1.5.3.3
  • individual-validated (4) legacy (1) — 2.23.140.1.5.4.1
  • individual-validated (4) multipurpose (2) — 2.23.140.1.5.4.2
  • individual-validated (4) strict (3) — 2.23.140.1.5.4.3
  • onion-EV(31) — 2.23.140.1.31 (TOR Service Descriptor OID for EV TLS certificates for .onion)
  • certificate-extensions(2)
  • test-certificate(1) — 2.23.140.2.1 (Test certificate) Deprecated
  • certificate-extensions(3)
  • cabforganization-identifier(1) — 2.23.140.3.1 (CA/Browser Forum Organization Identifier Field used in EV)
  • cabf-caSigningNonce(41) - 2.23.140.41 (CA signing nonce attribute that contains a Random Value that is generated by the CA used for verifying Applicant’s control over a .onion service)
  • cabf-applicantSigningNonce(42) - 2.23.140.42 (Applicant signing nonce attribute that contains a single value with at least 64-bits of entropy that is generated by the Applicant used during the verification of Applicant’s control over a .onion service)
Resources
Latest releases
Server Certificate Requirements
SC099: Improve Recording of Validation Methods - May 19, 2026

Code Signing Requirements
v3.8 - Aug 5, 2024

What’s Changed CSC-25: Import EV Guidelines to CS Baseline Requirements by @dzacharo in https://github.com/cabforum/code-signing/pull/38 Full Changelog: https://github.com/cabforum/code-signing/compare/v3.7...v3.8

S/MIME Requirements
v1.0.14 - Ballot SMC016 - May 5, 2026

This ballot maintains consistency between the S/MIME Baseline Requirements and the TLS Baseline Requirements with changes introduced by Ballots SC096 and SC097. Specifically, this ballot: Creates a carve-out of the logging requirements for DNSSEC specifically, stating these are not in scope. For audit purposes, change management logging is able to confirm if the appropriate controls are in effect or not. Sunsets all remaining use of SHA-1 signatures in Certificates and CRLs. It is noted that most uses of SHA-1 signatures are already deprecated by SC097. With this ballot, all unexpired Subordinate CA Certificates issuing S/MIME containing the SHA-1 signature algorithm must be revoked. This proposal does not prohibit the use of SHA-1 to generate issuerKeyHash or issuerNameHash values as currently required by RFC 5019. Includes minor formatting corrections.

Network and Certificate System Security Requirements
Version 2.0.5 (Ballot NS-008) - Jul 9, 2025

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The Certification Authority Browser Forum (CA/Browser Forum) is a voluntary gathering of Certificate Issuers and suppliers of Internet browser software and other applications that use certificates (Certificate Consumers).