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Object Registry

Object Registry of the CA / Browser Forum

The CA/Browser Forum node (assigned organization identifier) is: 2.23.140

{joint-iso-itu-t(2) international-organizations(23) ca-browser-forum(140)}

Here are the CA/B Forum-assigned Object Identifiers (OIDs):

  • certificate-policies(1)
  • extended-validation(1) — 2.23.140.1.1  (Certificate issued in compliance with the Extended Validation Guidelines)
  • baseline-requirements(2) — 2.23.140.1.2 (TLS Baseline Requirements)
  • domain-validated(1) — 2.23.140.1.2.1 (Certificate issued in compliance with the TLS Baseline Requirements – No entity identity asserted)
  • organization-validated(2) — 2.23.140.1.2.2 (Certificate issued in compliance with the TLS Baseline Requirements – Organization identity asserted)
  • individual-validated(3) — 2.23.140.1.2.3 (Certificate issued in compliance with the TLS Baseline Requirements – Individual identity asserted)
  • extended-validation-codesigning(3) — 2.23.140.1.3 (EV Code Signing Certificate issued in compliance with the Code Signing Baseline Requirements)
  • codesigning-requirements(4) codesigning(1) — 2.23.140.1.4.1 (Code Signing Certificate issued in compliance with the Code Signing Baseline Requirements)
  • codesigning-requirements(4) timestamping(2) — 2.23.140.1.4.2 (Timestamp Certificate issued in compliance with the Code Signing Baseline Requirements)
  • smime(5) — 2.23.140.1.5 (S/MIME Baseline Requirements)
  • mailbox-validated (1) legacy (1) — 2.23.140.1.5.1.1
  • mailbox-validated (1) multipurpose (2) — 2.23.140.1.5.1.2
  • mailbox-validated (1) strict (3) — 2.23.140.1.5.1.3
  • organization-validated (2) legacy (1) — 2.23.140.1.5.2.1
  • organization-validated (2) multipurpose (2) — 2.23.140.1.5.2.2
  • organization-validated (2) strict (3) — 2.23.140.1.5.2.3
  • sponsor-validated (3) legacy (1) — 2.23.140.1.5.3.1
  • sponsor-validated (3) multipurpose (2) — 2.23.140.1.5.3.2
  • sponsor-validated (3) strict (3) — 2.23.140.1.5.3.3
  • individual-validated (4) legacy (1) — 2.23.140.1.5.4.1
  • individual-validated (4) multipurpose (2) — 2.23.140.1.5.4.2
  • individual-validated (4) strict (3) — 2.23.140.1.5.4.3
  • onion-EV(31) — 2.23.140.1.31 (TOR Service Descriptor OID for EV TLS certificates for .onion)
  • certificate-extensions(2)
  • test-certificate(1) — 2.23.140.2.1 (Test certificate) Deprecated
  • certificate-extensions(3)
  • cabforganization-identifier(1) — 2.23.140.3.1 (CA/Browser Forum Organization Identifier Field used in EV)
  • cabf-caSigningNonce(41) - 2.23.140.41 (CA signing nonce attribute that contains a Random Value that is generated by the CA used for verifying Applicant’s control over a .onion service)
  • cabf-applicantSigningNonce(42) - 2.23.140.42 (Applicant signing nonce attribute that contains a single value with at least 64-bits of entropy that is generated by the Applicant used during the verification of Applicant’s control over a .onion service)
Latest releases
Server Certificate Requirements
SC-089: Mass Revocation Planning - Aug 26, 2025

Code Signing Requirements
v3.8 - Aug 5, 2024

What’s Changed CSC-25: Import EV Guidelines to CS Baseline Requirements by @dzacharo in https://github.com/cabforum/code-signing/pull/38 Full Changelog: https://github.com/cabforum/code-signing/compare/v3.7...v3.8

S/MIME Requirements
v1.0.12 - Ballot SMC014 - Oct 13, 2025

This ballot introduces requirements that a Certificate Issuer MUST deploy DNSSEC validation back to the IANA DNSSEC root trust anchor on all DNS queries associated with CAA record lookups performed by the Primary Network Perspective, effective March 15, 2026. The ballot is intended to maintain consistency in the S/MIME Baseline Requirements with the requirements of Ballot SC-085 which implemented identical requirements in the TLS Baseline Requirements. Note: SC-085 also introduced requirements in TLS Baseline Requirements for the use of DNSSEC in domain control validation. These requirements are automatically adopted in the S/MIME BR by the email domain control methods that include a normative reference to section 3.2.2.4 of the TLS Baseline Requirements. The draft also includes minor corrections to web links in the text. This ballot is proposed by Stephen Davidson (DigiCert) and endorsed by Client Wilson (Apple) and Ashish Dhiman (GlobalSign).

Network and Certificate System Security Requirements
Version 2.0.5 (Ballot NS-008) - Jul 9, 2025

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The Certification Authority Browser Forum (CA/Browser Forum) is a voluntary gathering of Certificate Issuers and suppliers of Internet browser software and other applications that use certificates (Certificate Consumers).