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Object Registry

Object Registry of the CA / Browser Forum

The CA/Browser Forum node (assigned organization identifier) is: 2.23.140

{joint-iso-itu-t(2) international-organizations(23) ca-browser-forum(140)}

Here are the CA/B Forum-assigned Object Identifiers (OIDs):

  • certificate-policies(1)
  • extended-validation(1) — 2.23.140.1.1  (Certificate issued in compliance with the Extended Validation Guidelines)
  • baseline-requirements(2) — 2.23.140.1.2 (TLS Baseline Requirements)
  • domain-validated(1) — 2.23.140.1.2.1 (Certificate issued in compliance with the TLS Baseline Requirements – No entity identity asserted)
  • organization-validated(2) — 2.23.140.1.2.2 (Certificate issued in compliance with the TLS Baseline Requirements – Organization identity asserted)
  • individual-validated(3) — 2.23.140.1.2.3 (Certificate issued in compliance with the TLS Baseline Requirements – Individual identity asserted)
  • extended-validation-codesigning(3) — 2.23.140.1.3 (EV Code Signing Certificate issued in compliance with the Code Signing Baseline Requirements)
  • codesigning-requirements(4) codesigning(1) — 2.23.140.1.4.1 (Code Signing Certificate issued in compliance with the Code Signing Baseline Requirements)
  • codesigning-requirements(4) timestamping(2) — 2.23.140.1.4.2 (Timestamp Certificate issued in compliance with the Code Signing Baseline Requirements)
  • smime(5) — 2.23.140.1.5 (S/MIME Baseline Requirements)
  • mailbox-validated (1) legacy (1) — 2.23.140.1.5.1.1
  • mailbox-validated (1) multipurpose (2) — 2.23.140.1.5.1.2
  • mailbox-validated (1) strict (3) — 2.23.140.1.5.1.3
  • organization-validated (2) legacy (1) — 2.23.140.1.5.2.1
  • organization-validated (2) multipurpose (2) — 2.23.140.1.5.2.2
  • organization-validated (2) strict (3) — 2.23.140.1.5.2.3
  • sponsor-validated (3) legacy (1) — 2.23.140.1.5.3.1
  • sponsor-validated (3) multipurpose (2) — 2.23.140.1.5.3.2
  • sponsor-validated (3) strict (3) — 2.23.140.1.5.3.3
  • individual-validated (4) legacy (1) — 2.23.140.1.5.4.1
  • individual-validated (4) multipurpose (2) — 2.23.140.1.5.4.2
  • individual-validated (4) strict (3) — 2.23.140.1.5.4.3
  • onion-EV(31) — 2.23.140.1.31 (TOR Service Descriptor OID for EV TLS certificates for .onion)
  • certificate-extensions(2)
  • test-certificate(1) — 2.23.140.2.1 (Test certificate) Deprecated
  • certificate-extensions(3)
  • cabforganization-identifier(1) — 2.23.140.3.1 (CA/Browser Forum Organization Identifier Field used in EV)
  • cabf-caSigningNonce(41) - 2.23.140.41 (CA signing nonce attribute that contains a Random Value that is generated by the CA used for verifying Applicant’s control over a .onion service)
  • cabf-applicantSigningNonce(42) - 2.23.140.42 (Applicant signing nonce attribute that contains a single value with at least 64-bits of entropy that is generated by the Applicant used during the verification of Applicant’s control over a .onion service)
Resources
Latest releases
Server Certificate Requirements
BRs/2.1.2 SC-080 V3: Sunset the use of WHOIS to identify Domain Contacts and relying DCV Methods - Dec 16, 2024

Ballot SC-080 V3: “Sunset the use of WHOIS to identify Domain Contact… (https://github.com/cabforum/servercert/pull/560) Ballot SC-080 V3: “Sunset the use of WHOIS to identify Domain Contacts and relying DCV Methods” (https://github.com/cabforum/servercert/pull/555)

Code Signing Requirements
v3.8 - Aug 5, 2024

What’s Changed CSC-25: Import EV Guidelines to CS Baseline Requirements by @dzacharo in https://github.com/cabforum/code-signing/pull/38 Full Changelog: https://github.com/cabforum/code-signing/compare/v3.7...v3.8

S/MIME Requirements
v1.0.8 - Ballot SMC010 - Dec 23, 2024

This ballot adopts Multi-Perspective Issuance Corroboration (MPIC) for CAs when conducting Email Domain Control Validation (DCV) and Certification Authority Authorization (CAA) checks for S/MIME Certificates. The Ballot adopts the MPIC implementation consistent with the TLS Baseline Requirements. Acknowledging that some S/MIME CAs with no TLS operations may require additional time to deploy MPIC, the Ballot has a Compliance Date of May 15, 2025. Following that date the implementation timeline described in TLS BR section 3.2.2.9 applies. This ballot is proposed by Stephen Davidson (DigiCert) and endorsed by Ashish Dhiman (GlobalSign) and Nicolas Lidzborski (Google).

Network and Certificate System Security Requirements
v2.0 - Ballot NS-003 - Jun 26, 2024

Ballot NS-003: Restructure the NCSSRs in https://github.com/cabforum/netsec/pull/35

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The Certification Authority Browser Forum (CA/Browser Forum) is a voluntary gathering of Certificate Issuers and suppliers of Internet browser software and other applications that use certificates (Certificate Consumers).