CA/Browser Forum
Home » All CA/Browser Forum Posts » Ballot SC100: DNSSEC Clarification and Consolidation

Ballot SC100: DNSSEC Clarification and Consolidation

Voting Results

Certificate Issuers

22 votes in total:

 * 22 voting YES: Actalis S.p.A., Asseco Data Systems SA (Certum), CFCA, Chunghwa Telecom, Cybertrust Japan, DigiCert, Disig, eMudhra, Fastly, HARICA, IdenTrust, iTrusChina, Japan Registry Services, Kamu SM, NAVER Cloud Trust Services, OISTE Foundation, SECOM Trust Systems, SHECA, SwissSign, Telia Company, TrustAsia, TWCA

  • 0 voting NO:

 * 0 ABSTAIN:

Certificate Consumers

3 votes in total:

 * 3 voting YES: Apple, Cisco Systems, Mozilla

 * 0 voting NO:

 * 0 ABSTAIN:

Bylaws Requirements

  1. Bylaw 2.3(6) requires:

 * In order for a ballot to be adopted by the Forum, two‐thirds (2/3) or more of the votes cast by the Voting Members in the Certificate Issuer category must be in favor of the ballot. This requirement was MET.

 * at least fifty percent (50%) plus one (1) of the votes cast by the Voting Members in the Certificate Consumer category must be in favor of the ballot. This requirement was MET.

 * At least one (1) Voting Member in each category must vote in favor of a ballot for the ballot to be adopted. This requirement was MET.

  1. Bylaw 2.3(7) requires:

 * A ballot result will be considered valid only when more than half of the number of currently active Voting Members has participated. The number of currently active Voting Members is the average number of Voting Member organizations that have participated in the previous three (3) Forum Meetings and Forum Teleconferences.

  * the quorum was 15 for this ballot. This requirement was MET.

Notice of Review Period

This Review Notice is sent pursuant to Section 4.1 of the CA/Browser Forum’s Intellectual Property Rights Policy (v1.3). This Review Period of 30 days is for one Final Maintenance Guidelines. The complete Draft Maintenance Guideline that is the subject of this Review Notice is attached to this email, both in red-line and changes-accepted draft format, in Word and PDF versions.

Summary of Review

Ballot for Review: SC100: DNSSEC Clarification and Consolidation

TBR-SC100.pdf

TBR-SC100-redlined.pdf

TBR-SC100.docx

TBR-SC100-redlined.docx

Start of Review Period: 2026-08-06 19:00:00 UTC

End of Review Period: 2026-09-05 19:00:00 UTC

Members with any Essential Claim(s) to exclude must forward a written Notice to Exclude Essential Claims to the Working Group Chair and also submit a copy to the CA/B Forum public mailing list (email to public at cabforum.org) before the end of the Review Period. For details, please see the current version of the CA/Browser Forum Intellectual Property Rights Policy. (An optional template for submitting an Exclusion Notice is available at https://cabforum.org/wp-content/uploads/Template-for-Exclusion-Notice.pdf)

Ballot Contents

— Ballot Background —

Discussion prior to, and at CA/Browser Forum Face to Face Meeting #67 in Houston, TX revealed that there was some lack of clarity regarding the DNSSEC validation requirements, particularly in the area of Remote Network Perspectives, as well as the fact that the DNSSEC validation requirements being somewhat scattered throughout Section 3.2.2 made it more difficult to pin down than it could be if all in one place.

— Ballot Summary —

Move all DNSSEC validation requirements to the new Section 4.2.2.2.

Reorganize the structure somewhat for easier reading and reduction of repetition.

Clarify that DNSSEC validation MAY be performed on Remote Network Perspectives, but is REQUIRED only on the Primary Network Perspective.

This ballot does not currently have an effective date, as the intent is merely to address clarity and there is no intention to modify the existing requirements

This ballot is proposed by Rich Smith (DigiCert) and endorsed by Trev Ponds-White (Amazon) and Scott Rea (eMudhra)

— Motion Begins —

Modify the “Baseline Requirements for the Issuance and Management of Publicly-Trusted Server Certificates”, based on Version 2.2.8, per the following redline:

https://github.com/cabforum/servercert/compare/9270ad7887b48d58bf0954336de32c265a934d66...b6dd09f33c3ef9a88672332faca3c4cbcb391276

— Motion Ends —

This ballot proposes a Final Maintenance Guideline. The procedure for approval of this ballot is as follows:

Discussion (COMPLETE):

  • Start time: 2026-06-30 17:00 UTC
  • End time: 2026-07-30 17:00 UTC

Vote for approval (7 days):

  • Start time: 2026-07-30 17:00 UTC
  • End time: 2026-08-06 17:00 UTC
Latest releases
Server Certificate Requirements
SC098: Process RFC 8657 CAA Parameters - Jun 16, 2026

Code Signing Requirements
v3.8 - Aug 5, 2024

What’s Changed CSC-25: Import EV Guidelines to CS Baseline Requirements by @dzacharo in https://github.com/cabforum/code-signing/pull/38 Full Changelog: https://github.com/cabforum/code-signing/compare/v3.7...v3.8

S/MIME Requirements
v1.0.15 - Ballot SMC017v2 - Jul 30, 2026

This ballot increases the minimum RSA key size for Root and Subordinate CA certificates in the S/MIME BRs from 2048 to 4096 bits for keys created after September 15, 2026, while retaining the 2048-bit minimum for Subscriber certificates. The ballot further requires that by September 15, 2027, CAs SHALL NOT issue Subscriber certificates from any Sub-CA whose RSA key modulus is less than 3072 bits, effectively sunsetting issuance from legacy 2048-bit Sub-CAs. The ballot also includes minor typographic corrections. This ballot is proposed by Martijn Katerbarg (Sectigo) and endorsed by Ben Wilson (Mozilla) and Stephen Davidson (DigiCert)

Network and Certificate System Security Requirements
Version 2.0.5 (Ballot NS-008) - Jul 9, 2025

Edit this page
The Certification Authority Browser Forum (CA/Browser Forum) is a voluntary gathering of Certificate Issuers and suppliers of Internet browser software and other applications that use certificates (Certificate Consumers).