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Ballot CSC-32: Make a Reserved Policy OID mandatory

The Intellectual Property Review (IPR) period for Ballot CSC-32 (Ballot CSC-32: Make a Reserved Policy OID mandatory) has completed.

No IPR Exclusion Notices were filed, and the ballot is adopted as of November 17, 2025.

The new CSC BRs v3.10.0 have been published to the CABF public website in accordance with the Bylaws: https://cabforum.org/uploads/CA-Browser-Forum-CSCBR-3.11.0.pdf

IPR Review of Ballot CSC-32: Make a Reserved Policy OID mandatory

This Review Notice is sent pursuant to Section 4.1 of the CA/Browser Forum’s Intellectual Property Rights Policy (v1.3). This Review Period of 30 days is for one Final Maintenance Guidelines. The complete Draft Maintenance Guideline that is the subject of this Review Notice is attached to this email.

Summary of Review

Ballot for Review: https://cabforum.org/2026/06/16/ballot-csc-32/. A redline is available at https://cabforum.org/uploads/CA-Browser-Forum-CSCBR-3.11.0-redline.pdf

  • Start of Review Period: 2026-05-11 08:30:00 UTC
  • End of Review Period: 2026-06-10 08:30:00 UTC

Members with any Essential Claim(s) to exclude must forward a written Notice to Exclude Essential Claims to the Working Group Chair (Stephen Davidson) and also submit a copy to the CA/B Forum public mailing list (public@groups.cabforum.org) before the end of the Review Period. For details, please see the current version of the CA/Browser Forum Intellectual Property Rights Policy. (An optional template for submitting an Exclusion Notice is available at https://cabforum.org/wp-content/uploads/Template-for-Exclusion-Notice.pdf)

Results of Ballot CSC-32: Make a Reserved Policy OID mandatory

The voting period for CSC-32: Make a Reserved Policy OID mandatory has completed. The ballot has: PASSED

Voting Results
Certificate Issuers
7 votes in total:
 * 7 voting YES: Actalis S.p.A., Asseco Data Systems SA (Certum), DigiCert, GlobalSign, HARICA, IdenTrust, Sectigo
 * 0 voting NO:
 * 0 ABSTAIN:

Certificate Consumers
1 votes in total:
 * 1 voting YES: Microsoft
 * 0 voting NO:
 * 0 ABSTAIN:

Bylaws Requirements

  1. Bylaw 2.3(6) requires:
     * In order for a ballot to be adopted by the Forum, two‐thirds (2/3) or more of the votes cast by the Voting Members in the Certificate Issuer category must be in favor of the ballot. This requirement was MET.
     * at least fifty percent (50%) plus one (1) of the votes cast by the Voting Members in the Certificate Consumer category must be in favor of the ballot. This requirement was MET.
     * At least one (1) Voting Member in each category must vote in favor of a ballot for the ballot to be adopted. This requirement was MET.
  2. Bylaw 2.3(7) requires:
     * A ballot result will be considered valid only when more than half of the number of currently active Voting Members has participated. The number of currently active Voting Members is the average number of Voting Member organizations that have participated in the previous three (3) Forum Meetings and Forum Teleconferences.
     * the quorum was 5 for this ballot. This requirement was MET.

This ballot now enters the IP Rights Review Period to permit members to review the ballot for relevant IP rights issues. This will be notified in a separate email.

Ballot CSC-32: Make a Reserved Policy OID mandatory

Summary:

This ballot updates the “Baseline Requirements for the Issuance and Management of Publicly‐Trusted Code Signing Certificates“ version 3.10 in order to modify the requirements regarding Certificate policy object identifiers (OIDs) in Subscriber Certificates. The main goals of this ballot are to:

Require the inclusion of a Reserved Policy OID in the CertificatePolicies extension Make it optional to include other CA-defined Reserved Policy OID(s) in the CertificatePolicies extension The following motion has been proposed by Adriano Santoni of Actalis and endorsed by Martijn Katerbarg of Sectigo and Corey Bonnell of DigiCert.

MOTION BEGINS

This ballot updates the “Baseline Requirements for the Issuance and Management of Publicly‐Trusted Code Signing Certificates” (“Code Signing Baseline Requirements”) based on version 3.10. MODIFY the Code Signing Baseline Requirements as specified in the following redline:

https://github.com/cabforum/code-signing/compare/89ca8c6ad215c77e7f1350d09c25c613a7bc0d75...e319130c26b64339cf21660e36f9d43e2a549726

MOTION ENDS

The procedure for this ballot is as follows:

Discussion (at least 7 days)

Start Time: 2026-04-27 08:30 UTC
End Time: 2026-05-04 08:30 UTC or later

Vote for approval (7 days)

Start Time: 2026-05-04 08:30 UTC or later
End Time: 2026-05-11 08:30 UTC or later
Latest releases
Server Certificate Requirements
SC098: Process RFC 8657 CAA Parameters - Jun 16, 2026

Code Signing Requirements
v3.8 - Aug 5, 2024

What’s Changed CSC-25: Import EV Guidelines to CS Baseline Requirements by @dzacharo in https://github.com/cabforum/code-signing/pull/38 Full Changelog: https://github.com/cabforum/code-signing/compare/v3.7...v3.8

S/MIME Requirements
v1.0.14 - Ballot SMC016 - May 5, 2026

This ballot maintains consistency between the S/MIME Baseline Requirements and the TLS Baseline Requirements with changes introduced by Ballots SC096 and SC097. Specifically, this ballot: Creates a carve-out of the logging requirements for DNSSEC specifically, stating these are not in scope. For audit purposes, change management logging is able to confirm if the appropriate controls are in effect or not. Sunsets all remaining use of SHA-1 signatures in Certificates and CRLs. It is noted that most uses of SHA-1 signatures are already deprecated by SC097. With this ballot, all unexpired Subordinate CA Certificates issuing S/MIME containing the SHA-1 signature algorithm must be revoked. This proposal does not prohibit the use of SHA-1 to generate issuerKeyHash or issuerNameHash values as currently required by RFC 5019. Includes minor formatting corrections.

Network and Certificate System Security Requirements
Version 2.0.5 (Ballot NS-008) - Jul 9, 2025

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