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2026-06-04 Minutes of the Server Certificate Working Group

Minutes:

Dimitris leading the meeting and taking minutes
Dimitris read the note-well.
No changes were requested for the agenda.
Minutes approval
- May 21, 2026 - these minutes were distributed on 2026-05-21. The minutes were approved.
Next call: June 18, 2026

Attendees

Aaron Gable (Let’s Encrypt), Aaron Poulsen (SSL.com), Adam Folson (IdenTrust), Adriano Santoni (Actalis S.p.A.), Alexandros Afentoulis (HARICA), Alvin Wang (SHECA), Andrea Holland (IdenTrust), Antti Backman (Telia Company), Arman Asemani (Apple), Ben Wilson (Mozilla), Chad Dandar (Cisco Systems), Chris Clements (Google), Clint Wilson (Apple), Cynethia Brown (US Federal PKI Management Authority), Daryn Wright (Apple), Dean Coclin (DigiCert), Dimitris Zacharopoulos (HARICA), Dustin Hollenback (Apple), Eamon Zhang (TrustAsia), Eleftheria Theologou (HARICA), Enrico Entschew (D-TRUST), Eric Hampshire (Cisco Systems), Georgy Sebastian (Amazon), Grace Cimaszewski (Grace Cimaszewski (Private Person)), Gregory Tomko (GlobalSign), Gurleen Grewal (Google), Hazhar Ismail (MSC Trustgate Sdn Bhd), Henry Birge-Lee (Henry Birge-Lee (Private person)), Hogeun Yoo (NAVER Cloud Trust Services), Inaba Atsushi (GlobalSign), India Donald (US Federal PKI Management Authority), Jan Smith (US Federal PKI Management Authority), Jinhwan Shin (CPA Canada/WebTrust), Joe DeBlasio (Google), John Mason (Microsoft), Johnny Reading (GoDaddy), Joseph Cigin (Joseph Cigin (Private Person)), Jos Purvis (Fastly), Josselin Allemandou (Certigna (DHIMYOTIS)), Jun Okura (Cybertrust Japan), Karina Sirota (Microsoft), Kateryna Aleksieieva (Asseco Data Systems SA (Certum)), Kiran Tummala (Apple), Li-Chun Chen (Chunghwa Telecom), Lilia Dubko (CPA Canada/WebTrust), Lucy Buecking (IdenTrust), Mads Henriksveen (Buypass AS), Mahua Chaudhuri (Microsoft), Marijn Nagelkerke (360 Browser), Mark Gamache (Mark Gamache (Private Person)), Mark Nelson (IdenTrust), Martijn Katerbarg (Sectigo), Masaru Sakamoto (Cybertrust Japan), Masatoshi Shigaki (CPA Canada/WebTrust), Matthew McPherrin (Let’s Encrypt), Michelle Coon (OATI), Mrugesh Chandarana (IdenTrust), Nate Smith (GoDaddy), Nick France (Sectigo), Nome Huang (TrustAsia), Ono Fumiaki (SECOM Trust Systems), Paul van Brouwershaven (Entrust), Paul van Brouwershaven (Digitorus), Pekka Lahtiharju (Telia Company), Peter Miskovic (Disig), Rebecca Kelly (SSL.com), Rob Brady (SGNR, LLC), Rob Stradling (Sectigo), Rob White (GoDaddy), Rollin Yu (TrustAsia), Roman Fischer (SwissSign), Sándor Szőke (Microsec), Sandy Balzer (SwissSign), Scott Rea (eMudhra), Sean Huang (TWCA), Sven Rajala (Keyfactor), Tadahiko Ito (SECOM Trust Systems), Tathan Thacker (IdenTrust), Thomas Connelly (US Federal PKI Management Authority), Thomas Zermeno (SSL.com), Tim Callan (Sectigo), Tim Crawford (CPA Canada/WebTrust), Tobias Josefowitz (Opera Software AS), Trevoli Ponds-White (Amazon), Tsung-Min Kuo (Chunghwa Telecom), Vikas Khanna (Microsoft), Vinay Kumar (OATI), Wayne Thayer (Fastly), Wendy Brown (US Federal PKI Management Authority), Zhao Kuisen (NovaVanguard Technology Co., Ltd.).

Latest releases

Server Certificate Requirements
SC098: Process RFC 8657 CAA Parameters - Jun 16, 2026

Code Signing Requirements
v3.8 - Aug 5, 2024

What’s Changed CSC-25: Import EV Guidelines to CS Baseline Requirements by @dzacharo in https://github.com/cabforum/code-signing/pull/38 Full Changelog: https://github.com/cabforum/code-signing/compare/v3.7...v3.8

S/MIME Requirements
v1.0.14 - Ballot SMC016 - May 5, 2026

This ballot maintains consistency between the S/MIME Baseline Requirements and the TLS Baseline Requirements with changes introduced by Ballots SC096 and SC097. Specifically, this ballot: Creates a carve-out of the logging requirements for DNSSEC specifically, stating these are not in scope. For audit purposes, change management logging is able to confirm if the appropriate controls are in effect or not. Sunsets all remaining use of SHA-1 signatures in Certificates and CRLs. It is noted that most uses of SHA-1 signatures are already deprecated by SC097. With this ballot, all unexpired Subordinate CA Certificates issuing S/MIME containing the SHA-1 signature algorithm must be revoked. This proposal does not prohibit the use of SHA-1 to generate issuerKeyHash or issuerNameHash values as currently required by RFC 5019. Includes minor formatting corrections.

Network and Certificate System Security Requirements
Version 2.0.5 (Ballot NS-008) - Jul 9, 2025