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Ballot SC094v2: DNSSEC exception in email DCV methods

Voting Results

Certificate Issuers

26 votes in total:

 * 26 voting YES: Actalis S.p.A., Amazon, Asseco Data Systems SA (Certum), Certigna (DHIMYOTIS), Chunghwa Telecom, Cybertrust Japan, DigiCert, Disig, D-TRUST, eMudhra, Fastly, GlobalSign, GoDaddy, HARICA, IdenTrust, iTrusChina, Japan Registry Services, MOIS (Ministry of Interior and Safety) of the republic of Korea, OISTE Foundation, SECOM Trust Systems, SHECA, SSL.com, SwissSign, Telia Company, TrustAsia, TWCA

  • 0 voting NO:

 * 0 ABSTAIN:

Certificate Consumers

2 votes in total:

 * 2 voting YES: Apple, Mozilla

 * 0 voting NO:

 * 0 ABSTAIN:

Bylaws Requirements

  1. Bylaw 2.3(6) requires:

 * In order for a ballot to be adopted by the Forum, two‐thirds (2/3) or more of the votes cast by the Voting Members in the Certificate Issuer category must be in favor of the ballot. This requirement was MET.

 * at least fifty percent (50%) plus one (1) of the votes cast by the Voting Members in the Certificate Consumer category must be in favor of the ballot. This requirement was MET.

 * At least one (1) Voting Member in each category must vote in favor of a ballot for the ballot to be adopted. This requirement was MET.

  1. Bylaw 2.3(7) requires:

 * A ballot result will be considered valid only when more than half of the number of currently active Voting Members has participated. The number of currently active Voting Members is the average number of Voting Member organizations that have participated in the previous three (3) Forum Meetings and Forum Teleconferences.

  * the quorum was 17 for this ballot. This requirement was MET.

Notice of Review Period

This Review Notice is sent pursuant to Section 4.1 of the CA/Browser Forum’s Intellectual Property Rights Policy (v1.3). This Review Period of 30 days is for one Final Maintenance Guidelines. The complete Draft Maintenance Guideline that is the subject of this Review Notice is attached to this email, both in red-line and changes-accepted draft format, in Word and PDF versions.

Summary of Review

Ballot for Review: SC094v2: DNSSEC exception in email DCV methods

TBR-SC94.pdf

TBR-SC94-redlined.pdf

TBR-SC94.docx

TBR-SC94-redlined.docx

Start of Review Period: 2026-01-15 18:00:00 UTC

End of Review Period: 2026-02-14 18:00:00 UTC

Members with any Essential Claim(s) to exclude must forward a written Notice to Exclude Essential Claims to the Working Group Chair and also submit a copy to the CA/B Forum public mailing list (email to public at cabforum.org) before the end of the Review Period. For details, please see the current version of the CA/Browser Forum Intellectual Property Rights Policy. (An optional template for submitting an Exclusion Notice is available at https://cabforum.org/wp-content/uploads/Template-for-Exclusion-Notice.pdf)

Ballot Contents

Summary:

After discussions around DNSSEC enforcement 1 2 3 for all Domain Validation methods, and with the WG’s decision that the e-mail Domain Validation methods are scheduled to be deprecated (SC090), in order to reduce complexity and confusion around the way to enforce DNSSEC checks on the various email service agents, an exception to the DNSSEC enforcement is proposed for those methods.

This version (2) fixes an inconsistency issue raised on the SCWG public list.

More information is available in this pull request.

The following motion has been proposed by Dimitris Zacharopoulos (HARICA) and endorsed by Roman Fischer (SwissSign) and Adriano Santoni (Actalis).

— Motion Begins —

This ballot modifies the “Baseline Requirements for the Issuance and Management of Publicly-Trusted TLS Server Certificates” (“Baseline Requirements”), based on Version 2.1.9.

MODIFY the Baseline Requirements as specified in the following Redline: https://github.com/cabforum/servercert/compare/a9f40a597e45605e499bc73a64aaa1d607bd5b0a.

— Motion Ends —

This ballot proposes a Final Maintenance Guideline. The procedure for approval of this ballot is as follows:

Discussion (at least 7 days)

  • Start time: 2025-12-19 13:00:00 UTC
  • End time: on or after 2025-12-26 13:00:00 UTC

Vote for approval (7 days)

  • Start time: 2026-01-08 06:15:00 UTC
  • End time: 2026-01-15 06:15:00 UTC
Latest releases
Server Certificate Requirements
SC099: Improve Recording of Validation Methods - May 19, 2026

Code Signing Requirements
v3.8 - Aug 5, 2024

What’s Changed CSC-25: Import EV Guidelines to CS Baseline Requirements by @dzacharo in https://github.com/cabforum/code-signing/pull/38 Full Changelog: https://github.com/cabforum/code-signing/compare/v3.7...v3.8

S/MIME Requirements
v1.0.14 - Ballot SMC016 - May 5, 2026

This ballot maintains consistency between the S/MIME Baseline Requirements and the TLS Baseline Requirements with changes introduced by Ballots SC096 and SC097. Specifically, this ballot: Creates a carve-out of the logging requirements for DNSSEC specifically, stating these are not in scope. For audit purposes, change management logging is able to confirm if the appropriate controls are in effect or not. Sunsets all remaining use of SHA-1 signatures in Certificates and CRLs. It is noted that most uses of SHA-1 signatures are already deprecated by SC097. With this ballot, all unexpired Subordinate CA Certificates issuing S/MIME containing the SHA-1 signature algorithm must be revoked. This proposal does not prohibit the use of SHA-1 to generate issuerKeyHash or issuerNameHash values as currently required by RFC 5019. Includes minor formatting corrections.

Network and Certificate System Security Requirements
Version 2.0.5 (Ballot NS-008) - Jul 9, 2025

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