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2025-12-04 Minutes of the Forum

Final Minutes of CA/B Forum meeting December 4, 2025

Approval of minutes:
- November 6th minutes: approved
- F2F minutes: approved
Server Certificate Working Group update (Dimitris): Summary of November 20th meetings. Basically: summary of the ballots, not much progress.
Validation: no meeting last week.
Code Signing Certificate Working Group update (Martijn): no updates. Next meeting next week.
S/MIME Certificate Working Group update (Stephen): invited guests. SMIME BR has made improvement over time in the security of the ecosystem. Additional study: relatively high occurrence of key-reuse. Topic for 2026. Number of ballots for the new year, relating to pseudonyms and mobile driver licenses. Upcoming discussions: SMTP to SMTP, close enough to SMIME to find out what the problem is. Next steps to be determined.
NetSec Working Group update (Clint): Not much discussion on the re-write, but next steps on cloud services. Very specific use cases, implementation guidance. No specific driver for that though.
Definitions and Glossary Working Group (Tim H.): Waiting for resource to become available.
Forum Infrastructure Subcommittee update (Jos): No update. Membership tools are down at the moment. This may delay sending out emails of recordings and minutes, just the automated ones.
Any Other Business: Proposal for new Membership category. Action to put in a ballot – will put a draft ballot forward in the next week.
Next call: Dec 18, 2025

Attendees:
Aaron Gable (Let’s Encrypt), Aaron Poulsen (Amazon), Adriano Santoni (Actalis S.p.A.), Alvin Wang (SHECA), Antti Backman (Telia Company), Ben Wilson (Mozilla), Chad Dandar (Cisco Systems), Chris Clements (Google), Clint Wilson (Apple), Corey Bonnell (DigiCert), Cynethia Brown (US Federal PKI Management Authority), Dean Coclin (DigiCert), Dimitris Zacharopoulos (HARICA), Dustin Hollenback (Apple), Enrico Entschew (D-TRUST), Eric Kramer (Sectigo), Eva Vansteenberge (GlobalSign), Hogeun Yoo (NAVER Cloud Trust Services), Inaba Atsushi (GlobalSign), Iñigo Barreira (Sectigo), Jaime Hablutzel (OISTE Foundation), Jeanette Snook (Visa), Jeff Ward (CPA Canada/WebTrust), Johnny Reading (GoDaddy), Jun Okura (Cybertrust Japan), Kateryna Aleksieieva (Asseco Data Systems SA (Certum)), Lilia Dubko (CPA Canada/WebTrust), Lucy Buecking (IdenTrust), Mahua Chaudhuri (Microsoft), Marco Schambach (IdenTrust), Martijn Katerbarg (Sectigo), Masaru Sakamoto (Cybertrust Japan), Matthew McPherrin (Let’s Encrypt), Michael Slaughter (Amazon), Michelle Coon (OATI), Nargis Mannan (VikingCloud), Nate Smith (GoDaddy), Nome Huang (TrustAsia), Ono Fumiaki (SECOM Trust Systems), Pedro Fuentes (OISTE Foundation), Peter Miskovic (Disig), Rebecca Kelly (SSL.com), Rollin Yu (TrustAsia), Roman Fischer (SwissSign), Ryan Dickson (Google), Sandy Balzer (SwissSign), Scott Rea (eMudhra), Sean Huang (TWCA), Stephen Davidson (DigiCert), Steven Deitte (GoDaddy), Tobias Josefowitz (Opera Software AS), Wayne Thayer (Fastly), Wendy Brown (US Federal PKI Management Authority), Yamian Quintero (Microsoft)

Latest releases

Server Certificate Requirements
SC099: Improve Recording of Validation Methods - May 19, 2026

Code Signing Requirements
v3.8 - Aug 5, 2024

What’s Changed CSC-25: Import EV Guidelines to CS Baseline Requirements by @dzacharo in https://github.com/cabforum/code-signing/pull/38 Full Changelog: https://github.com/cabforum/code-signing/compare/v3.7...v3.8

S/MIME Requirements
v1.0.14 - Ballot SMC016 - May 5, 2026

This ballot maintains consistency between the S/MIME Baseline Requirements and the TLS Baseline Requirements with changes introduced by Ballots SC096 and SC097. Specifically, this ballot: Creates a carve-out of the logging requirements for DNSSEC specifically, stating these are not in scope. For audit purposes, change management logging is able to confirm if the appropriate controls are in effect or not. Sunsets all remaining use of SHA-1 signatures in Certificates and CRLs. It is noted that most uses of SHA-1 signatures are already deprecated by SC097. With this ballot, all unexpired Subordinate CA Certificates issuing S/MIME containing the SHA-1 signature algorithm must be revoked. This proposal does not prohibit the use of SHA-1 to generate issuerKeyHash or issuerNameHash values as currently required by RFC 5019. Includes minor formatting corrections.

Unable to retrieve latest release information from the netsec repository.