CA/Browser Forum
Home » All CA/Browser Forum Posts » 2025-11-20 Minutes of the Server Certificate Working Group

2025-11-20 Minutes of the Server Certificate Working Group

Dimitris read the note well.

Meeting minutes for November 6th were approved.

Dimitris provided the current ballot status (as indicated in agenda).

The status for ballots under consideration was provided by various members:

  1. Corey said SC-87 will be moving again soon now that SC-86 passed.

  2. Rich said that there are a few aspects that are being discussed on the ADN ballot and will revert soon. Aaron said there was good discussion on the validation call last week. Since then, the draft ballot has been updated to allow CNAME-then-prune for DNS-based validation and increase readability using tables.

  3. Martijn said that Aaron and Corey provided feedback on the revocation requirements improvement ballot. He asked for more reviews.

  4. Clint said that he’s waiting for the queue of ballots to be processed before proceeding with the “validation method in certificates” ballot. He said that he is still considering feedback from Corey.

  5. Dimitris said he will circulate a ballot next week for discussion to exempt DNSSEC validation for email-based validation methods, as discussed on the mailing list and at the F2F. He said that there are already two endorsers. Aaron asked if the ballot will also exempt CNAME lookups from DNSSEC validation for email-based validation. Dimitris said that DNSSEC validation in this case is fine. The intent of the ballot is only exempt MX record lookups from DNSSEC validation.

  6. Dimitris said that the Asseco team has been working on the 2025 cleanup ballot. He said he will follow up with the Asseco team on next steps.

Dimitris said that it’s not necessary to sequence ballots and it is possible to have multiple ballots running at the same time.

There is no other business.

Meeting adjourned.

Attendees

Aaron Gable (Let’s Encrypt), Adam Jones (Microsoft), Adriano Santoni (Actalis S.p.A.), Alvin Wang (SHECA), Antti Backman (Telia Company), Ben Wilson (Mozilla), Brianca Martin (Amazon), Chris Clements (Google), Clint Wilson (Apple), Corey Bonnell (DigiCert), Cynethia Brown (US Federal PKI Management Authority), Dean Coclin (DigiCert), Dimitris Zacharopoulos (HARICA), Dustin Hollenback (Apple), Enrico Entschew (D-TRUST), Hogeun Yoo (NAVER Cloud Trust Services), Inaba Atsushi (GlobalSign), Iñigo Barreira (Sectigo), Jeanette Snook (Visa), Jeff Ward (CPA Canada/WebTrust), Jos Purvis (Fastly), Jun Okura (Cybertrust Japan), Lilia Dubko (CPA Canada/WebTrust), Lucy Buecking (IdenTrust), Luis Cervantes (SSL.com), Lynn Jeun (Visa), Mahua Chaudhuri (Microsoft), Marco Schambach (IdenTrust), Martijn Katerbarg (Sectigo), Matthew McPherrin (Let’s Encrypt), Michelle Coon (OATI), Nargis Mannan (VikingCloud), Nate Smith (GoDaddy), Nome Huang (TrustAsia), Ono Fumiaki (SECOM Trust Systems), Paul van Brouwershaven (Entrust), Peter Miskovic (Disig), Rebecca Kelly (SSL.com), Rich Smith (DigiCert), Rollin Yu (TrustAsia), Roman Fischer (SwissSign), Ryan Dickson (Google), Sandy Balzer (SwissSign), Scott Rea (eMudhra), Sean Huang (TWCA), Stephen Davidson (DigiCert), Steven Deitte (GoDaddy), Sven Rajala (Keyfactor), Tathan Thacker (IdenTrust), Tobias Josefowitz (Opera Software AS), Wayne Thayer (Fastly), Wendy Brown (US Federal PKI Management Authority), Wiktoria Więckowska (Asseco Data Systems SA (Certum)), Yamian Quintero (Microsoft)

Latest releases
Server Certificate Requirements
SC099: Improve Recording of Validation Methods - May 19, 2026

Code Signing Requirements
v3.8 - Aug 5, 2024

What’s Changed CSC-25: Import EV Guidelines to CS Baseline Requirements by @dzacharo in https://github.com/cabforum/code-signing/pull/38 Full Changelog: https://github.com/cabforum/code-signing/compare/v3.7...v3.8

S/MIME Requirements
v1.0.14 - Ballot SMC016 - May 5, 2026

This ballot maintains consistency between the S/MIME Baseline Requirements and the TLS Baseline Requirements with changes introduced by Ballots SC096 and SC097. Specifically, this ballot: Creates a carve-out of the logging requirements for DNSSEC specifically, stating these are not in scope. For audit purposes, change management logging is able to confirm if the appropriate controls are in effect or not. Sunsets all remaining use of SHA-1 signatures in Certificates and CRLs. It is noted that most uses of SHA-1 signatures are already deprecated by SC097. With this ballot, all unexpired Subordinate CA Certificates issuing S/MIME containing the SHA-1 signature algorithm must be revoked. This proposal does not prohibit the use of SHA-1 to generate issuerKeyHash or issuerNameHash values as currently required by RFC 5019. Includes minor formatting corrections.

Network and Certificate System Security Requirements
Version 2.0.5 (Ballot NS-008) - Jul 9, 2025

Edit this page
The Certification Authority Browser Forum (CA/Browser Forum) is a voluntary gathering of Certificate Issuers and suppliers of Internet browser software and other applications that use certificates (Certificate Consumers).