

Accredited Conformity Assessment Bodies Council

**ACAB'c update Clemens Wanko** 

64<sup>th</sup> CA/B Forum F2F Meeting Mar. 25<sup>th</sup> to 27<sup>th</sup> 2025 – Tokyo



#### **Updates from the Council**


- New board elected
- CA is Critical Infrastructure (European NIS2)
- Report update: Audit Attestation Letter Templates

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#### ACAB'c board:

- Matthias, TUV NORD CERT (Chair)
   Svetlana, Deutsche Telekom
   and
   Sascha, SRC (Vice Chairs)
- Clemens, TUV AUSTRIA and Takwa, LSTI (Treasurer)




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#### **CA** = critical infrastructure:

(European NIS2)



Official Journal L series 2024/2690 18.10.2024 COMMISSION IMPLEMENTING REGULATION (EU) 2024/2690 of 17 October 2024 laying down rules for the application of Directive (EU) 2022/2555 as regards technical and methodological requirements of cybersecurity risk-management measures and further specification of the cases in which an incident is considered to be significant with regard to DNS service providers, TLD name registries, cloud computing service providers, data centre service providers, content delivery network providers, managed service providers, managed security service providers or notices of online market places, of online search engines and of social networking services platforms, and trust service providers (Text with EEA relevance) THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION Having regard to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, Having regard to Directive (EU) 2022/2555 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 December 2022 on measures for a high common level of cybersecurity across the Union, amending Regulation (EU) No 910/2014 and Directive (EU) 2018/1972, and repealing Directive (EU) 2016/1148 (NIS 2 Directive) (\*\*), and in particular Articles 21(5), first subparagoph and 23(11), second subparagoph thereof. (1) With regard to DNS service providers, TLD name registries, cloud computing service providers, data centre service providers, content delivery network providers, managed service providers, managed security service providers, providers of online market places, of online search engines and of social networking services platforms, and trust service providers as covered by Article 3 of Directive (EU) 2022/2555 (the relevant entities), this Regulation aims to lay down the technical and the methodological requirements of the measures referred to in Article 21(2) of Directive (EU) 2022/2555 and to further specify the cases in which an incident should be considered to be significant as (2) Taking account of the cross-border nature of their activities and in order to ensure a coherent framework for trust service providers, this Regulation should, with respect to trust service providers, further specify the cases in which an incident shall be considered to be significant, in addition to laying down the technical and the methodological requirements of the cybersecurity risk-management measures. (3) Following Article 21(5), third subparagraph of Directive (EU) 2022/2555, the technical and methodological requirements of the cybersecurity risk-management measures set out in the Annex to this Regulation are based on European and international standards, such as ISO/IEC 27001, ISO/IEC 27002 and ETSI EN 319401, and technical specifications, such as CEN/TS 18026:2024, relevant to the security of network and information systems. (4) As regards the implementation and application of the technical and the methodological requirements of cybersecurity risk-management measures set out in the Annex to this Regulation, in line with the principle of proportionality, due account should be taken of the divergent risk exposure of relevant entities, such as the

criticality of the relevant entity, the risks to which it is exposed, the relevant entity's size and structure as well as the likelihood of occurrence of incidents and their severity, including their societal and economic impact, when complying with the technical and methodological requirements of othersecurity risk-manasement measures set out

in the Annex to this Regulation.

TSP (CA) = important entity QTSP (QCA) = essential entity

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
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# I. Key Ceremony Report:

Please download from:

https:\\acab-c.com\downloads



### I. Key Ceremony Report:


Please carefully consider application notes!

Audit Attestation "No. unique identifier", issued to "name of the audited company" In particular: The key generation ceremony was performed by [number] individuals of the CA Owner acting in Trusted Roles . The key generation ceremony was observed by [number] individual of the Conformity Assessment Body with independence from the CA Owner · Principles of multiparty control and split knowledge were observed. . The CA key pairs were generated in a physically secured environment as described in the CA's [CP / CPS]. The CA key pairs were generated within cryptographic modules meeting the applicable technical and business requirements as disclosed in the CA's [CP / CPS]. CA key pair generation activities were logged. · Effective controls were maintained to provide reasonable assurance that the private key was generated and protected in conformance with the procedures described in its [CP / CPS] and the Key Generation Script. The key generation ceremony has been witnessed in person. Wiedenhorst, Matthias A video of the key generation ceremony has been prepared by the certification service provider Choose the applicable sentence and delete the and checked by the auditor. No non-conformities have been identified during the audit. Wiedenhorst, Matthias In case of non-conformitties, the CAB must not issue a key ceremony report. A new ceremony must be performed after the issues have been solved.

# II. Standard Report parked keys update:

Parked keys to be addressed in Standard Report!

In prep!
Template to be released shortly





# III. General reporting matters: Mozilla RSP 3.0 release

Mass revocation procedure...

- Details open to be defined
  - audit frequency one time/regular?
  - reporting aspects
    - separate/joint?
    - in Standard AAL/in detailed sub-reports?

Q: how do other Browsers plan to handle "mass revocation"? Common BRG requirement preferred!





# For further information or in order to register, please contact us at: www.acab-c.com



The Accredited Conformity Assessment Bodies' council

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