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2025-02-06 Minutes of the Code Signing Certificate Working Group

Attendees

Brian Winters (IdenTrust), Bruce Morton (Entrust), Corey Bonnell (DigiCert), Dimitris Zacharopoulos (HARICA), Inaba Atsushi (GlobalSign), Josselin Allemandou (Certigna (DHIMYOTIS)), Kateryna Aleksieieva (Asseco Data Systems SA (Certum)), Marco Schambach (IdenTrust), Martijn Katerbarg (Sectigo), Nome Huang (TrustAsia), Scott Rea (eMudhra), Thomas Zermeno (SSL.com), Tim Crawford (CPA Canada/WebTrust), Yateesh Bhardwaj (GlobalSign)

Martijn called the meeting to order and read the Note Well.

The January 23rd meeting meetings were approved.

Maximum validity of CS certificates

Martijn said the proposed effective date is June 15th. He asked if we need to amend the date. Dimitris and Corey both said that we need to discuss the date with Microsoft.

Aligning CSBRs with recent SCWG ballots

Bruce said the ballot is ready to move forward. Corey will propose and Martijn and Bruce will endorse.

Cleanup ballot

Martijn is starting to work on this ballot to clean up effective dates.

Moving towards a single profile

No further discussion; need Microsoft on the call to help establish direction.

Any other business

Martijn said the recent meetings have been quite short. Scott suggested we could skip a meeting or two until Microsoft can participate.

Next meeting is February 20th.

Meeting adjourned.

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