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2024-08-08 Minutes of the Code Signing Certificate Working Group

Attendees

Dean Coclin(DigiCert), Corey Bonnell (DigiCert), Inigo Barreira (Sectigo), Thomas Zermeno (SSL.com), Brianca Martin (Amazon), Martijn Katerbarg (Sectigo), Rebecca Kelley (SSL.com), Bruce Morton (Entrust), Trevoli Ponds-White (Amazon), Mohit Kumar (Globalsign), Tim Hollebeek (DigiCert), Scott Rea (eMudhra), Brian Winters (Identrust), Atsushi Inaba (Globalsign)

Minutes

Antitrust reminder was read.
Prior meeting minutes approved: July 11, July 25th. The June 27th minutes are pending approval for the next call.
IPR review is completed for CSC-25.
IPR review is completed for CSC-26.
Ian was not on the call, so the validity period topic was not discussed. Brianca suggested that the unit of measure be “days” instead of “months”. This will be conveyed to Ian.
SKI requirements question from Viktor Varga: This was acknowledged as an omission and will be added to a future clean-up ballot.
Simplifying EV: Tim was not prepared to discuss today and suggested we postpone until Ian returns.
Fall elections will be conducted at the Forum level. Chair nominations are open.
No other business.
Next meeting Aug 22nd. Dean will be away so Bruce will chair the call.
Adjourn

Latest releases

Server Certificate Requirements
SC095v3: Clean-up 2025 - Apr 2, 2026

Code Signing Requirements
v3.8 - Aug 5, 2024

What’s Changed CSC-25: Import EV Guidelines to CS Baseline Requirements by @dzacharo in https://github.com/cabforum/code-signing/pull/38 Full Changelog: https://github.com/cabforum/code-signing/compare/v3.7...v3.8

S/MIME Requirements
v1.0.14 - Ballot SMC016 - May 5, 2026

This ballot maintains consistency between the S/MIME Baseline Requirements and the TLS Baseline Requirements with changes introduced by Ballots SC096 and SC097. Specifically, this ballot: Creates a carve-out of the logging requirements for DNSSEC specifically, stating these are not in scope. For audit purposes, change management logging is able to confirm if the appropriate controls are in effect or not. Sunsets all remaining use of SHA-1 signatures in Certificates and CRLs. It is noted that most uses of SHA-1 signatures are already deprecated by SC097. With this ballot, all unexpired Subordinate CA Certificates issuing S/MIME containing the SHA-1 signature algorithm must be revoked. This proposal does not prohibit the use of SHA-1 to generate issuerKeyHash or issuerNameHash values as currently required by RFC 5019. Includes minor formatting corrections.

Network and Certificate System Security Requirements
Version 2.0.5 (Ballot NS-008) - Jul 9, 2025