CA/Browser Forum
Home » Posts » Ballot CSC-24 - Timestamping Private Key Protection

Ballot CSC-24 - Timestamping Private Key Protection

Results of Voting

YesNoAbstain
Certificate IssuersDigiCert, Entrust, Globalsign, HARICA, IdenTrust, Sectigo
Certificate Consumers

There were not enough Certificate Consumer votes to pass the ballot. Therefore, the ballot FAILS.

Purpose of the Ballot

This ballot updates the “Baseline Requirements for the Issuance and Management of Publicly‐Trusted Code Signing Certificates“ version 3.7 in order to clarify language regarding Timestamp Authority Private Key Protection. The main goals of this ballot are to:

  1. Require Private Keys associated with newly issued Timestamp Authority Subordinate CA to be stored in offline HSMs
  2. Require newly issued Timestamp Certificates to be issued from a TSA CA with its Private key storedn in offline HSMs
  3. Add a requirement to remove Private Keys associated with Timestamp Certificates after a 18 months
  4. Add a requirement to reject SHA-1 timestamp requests

The following motion has been proposed by Martijn Katerbarg of Sectigo and endorsed by Bruce Morton of Entrust and Ian McMillan of Microsoft.

Motion

This ballot updates the “Baseline Requirements for the Issuance and Management of Publicly‐Trusted Code Signing Certificates” (“Code Signing Baseline Requirements”) based on version 3.7. MODIFY the Code Signing Baseline Requirements as specified in the following redline: https://github.com/cabforum/code-signing/compare/d431d9104094f2b89f35ed4bf1d64b9a844e762b...61d9426e9025d448a13eb56fa75b9651b2136548

Edit this page
The Certification Authority Browser Forum (CA/Browser Forum) is a voluntary gathering of Certificate Issuers and suppliers of Internet browser software and other applications that use certificates (Certificate Consumers).