Ballot CSC-24 - Timestamping Private Key Protection
Results of Voting
| Yes | No | Abstain | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Certificate Issuers | DigiCert, Entrust, Globalsign, HARICA, IdenTrust, Sectigo | ||
| Certificate Consumers |
There were not enough Certificate Consumer votes to pass the ballot. Therefore, the ballot FAILS.
Purpose of the Ballot
This ballot updates the “Baseline Requirements for the Issuance and Management of Publicly‐Trusted Code Signing Certificates“ version 3.7 in order to clarify language regarding Timestamp Authority Private Key Protection. The main goals of this ballot are to:
- Require Private Keys associated with newly issued Timestamp Authority Subordinate CA to be stored in offline HSMs
- Require newly issued Timestamp Certificates to be issued from a TSA CA with its Private key storedn in offline HSMs
- Add a requirement to remove Private Keys associated with Timestamp Certificates after a 18 months
- Add a requirement to reject SHA-1 timestamp requests
The following motion has been proposed by Martijn Katerbarg of Sectigo and endorsed by Bruce Morton of Entrust and Ian McMillan of Microsoft.
Motion
This ballot updates the “Baseline Requirements for the Issuance and Management of Publicly‐Trusted Code Signing Certificates” (“Code Signing Baseline Requirements”) based on version 3.7. MODIFY the Code Signing Baseline Requirements as specified in the following redline: https://github.com/cabforum/code-signing/compare/d431d9104094f2b89f35ed4bf1d64b9a844e762b...61d9426e9025d448a13eb56fa75b9651b2136548