CA/Browser Forum
Home » All CA/Browser Forum Posts » Ballot CSC-23 - Marking the EV Code Signing Guidelines SUPERCEDED

Ballot CSC-23 - Marking the EV Code Signing Guidelines SUPERCEDED

The final documents, with the effective date being 2024-03-26, are available here.

Results of Voting

YesNoAbstain
Certificate IssuersActalis, Asseco (Certum), DigiCert, Entrust, Globalsign, HARICA, IdenTrust, Sectigo, SSL.com
Certificate ConsumersMicrosoft

Purpose of the Ballot

As agreed at the F2F#61 meeting, this is a ballot to mark the “Guidelines For The Issuance And Management Of Extended Validation Code Signing Certificates” as superceded.

The following motion has been proposed by Dimitris Zacharopoulos of HARICA and endorsed by Scott Rea of eMudhra and Martijn Katerbarg of Sectigo.

Motion

Update the EVCS Guidelines v1.4 to version 1.5 with the following changes: In the “Notice to Readers” section, update the second paragraph to state:

“The Code Signing Working Group considers this document SUPERCEDED as of September 2, 2020. CAs SHOULD NOT use this standard but instead SHOULD use the “Baseline Requirements for the Issuance and Management of Publicly‐Trusted Code Signing Certificates” that has incorporated and improved requirements related to Extended Validation (EV) Code Signing Certificates.”

Update section 17.1 to state the following:

“As this document is marked SUPERCEDED, CAs SHOULD NOT be audited against this standard. "

Latest releases
Server Certificate Requirements
SC099: Improve Recording of Validation Methods - May 19, 2026

Code Signing Requirements
v3.8 - Aug 5, 2024

What’s Changed CSC-25: Import EV Guidelines to CS Baseline Requirements by @dzacharo in https://github.com/cabforum/code-signing/pull/38 Full Changelog: https://github.com/cabforum/code-signing/compare/v3.7...v3.8

S/MIME Requirements
v1.0.14 - Ballot SMC016 - May 5, 2026

This ballot maintains consistency between the S/MIME Baseline Requirements and the TLS Baseline Requirements with changes introduced by Ballots SC096 and SC097. Specifically, this ballot: Creates a carve-out of the logging requirements for DNSSEC specifically, stating these are not in scope. For audit purposes, change management logging is able to confirm if the appropriate controls are in effect or not. Sunsets all remaining use of SHA-1 signatures in Certificates and CRLs. It is noted that most uses of SHA-1 signatures are already deprecated by SC097. With this ballot, all unexpired Subordinate CA Certificates issuing S/MIME containing the SHA-1 signature algorithm must be revoked. This proposal does not prohibit the use of SHA-1 to generate issuerKeyHash or issuerNameHash values as currently required by RFC 5019. Includes minor formatting corrections.

Network and Certificate System Security Requirements
Version 2.0.5 (Ballot NS-008) - Jul 9, 2025

Edit this page
The Certification Authority Browser Forum (CA/Browser Forum) is a voluntary gathering of Certificate Issuers and suppliers of Internet browser software and other applications that use certificates (Certificate Consumers).