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2023-05-18 Minutes of the Code Signing Certificate Working Group

Attendees

Atsushi Inaba (GlobalSign), Ben Dewberry (Keyfactor), Bianca Martin (Amazon), Bruce Morton (Entrust), Corey Bonnell (DigiCert), Dean Coclin (DigiCert), Eva Van Steenberge (GlobalSign), Ian McMillan (Microsoft), Inigo Barreira (Sectigo), Martijn Katerbarg (Sectigo), Mohit Kumar (GlobalSign), Roberto Quiñones (Intel), Rollin Yu (TrustAsia), Tim Crawford (BDO), Tim Hollebeek (DigiCert)

Minutes

  • The Antitrust statement was read
  • Minutes from May 4th approved
  • Ballot: CSC 18 – Malware base revocation (Martijn)
  • In discussion period, voting period ending before meeting is over
  • Dean: tracker shows quorum met
  • Removing SSL BR References
  • Martjin: About half docs reviewed for missing definitions. Removed 2 definitions that are not used. A couple may need to be added, will need to discuss
  • Subject Name stability
  • Email from new interested party (Mike Hearn)
  • Ian: MSIX (Appx) does hash calculation of the publisher’s name value that is in the manifest and compares it to the full subject name value of signing certificate
  • Was working fine when only used inside of store distribution. As its been rolled out broadly to allow MSI package into MSIX, they’ve run into this issue for companies that change their name or locale.
  • New packages would validate fine but presents inability to update existing apps because it depends on Package Name alignment.
  • This is Microsoft MSIX issue, not a broad certificate issuance problem.
  • Tim: This is example of using [subject] name instead of global identifier and this has all the issues that are well known.
  • Bruce: Even global identifier might change if company changes name, like with SSL and org ID
  • Ian: Apple and Google offer ways to uniquely identify orgs. If Microsoft offered something similar, it would not be something that Public CAs should have to do.
  • Ian will draft a response to this email
  • June F2F is June 6th afternoon.
  • Dean moves to cancel call scheduled for Jun 1st. No objections
  • Agenda for F2F
  • Time: 1:45pm to 3:45pm (nothing scheduled after this, so could keep going)
  • Ian: no guest speaker for code signing workgroup. Roy Williams is going to talk about Secure Supply Chain Integrity, Trust and Transparency.
  • Bruce: Spend some time reviewing time stamping changes Ian is proposing. Discuss EV Certificates. Continue discussion on Certificate Transparency
  • Dean may not be able to attend in person, Bruce can facilitate
Latest releases
Server Certificate Requirements
SC100: DNSSEC Clarification and Consolidation - Sep 7, 2026

Code Signing Requirements
v3.8 - Aug 5, 2024

What’s Changed CSC-25: Import EV Guidelines to CS Baseline Requirements by @dzacharo in https://github.com/cabforum/code-signing/pull/38 Full Changelog: https://github.com/cabforum/code-signing/compare/v3.7...v3.8

S/MIME Requirements
v1.0.17 - Ballot SMC020 - Nov 20, 2026

Addresses https://github.com/cabforum/smime/issues/308. Aligns the S/MIME BR with TLS BR Ballot SC-099. Changes Section 3.2.2: Removes the requirement to record the validation method “including the relevant version number” from the TLS BR or S/MIME BR. This version number is unclear and can’t be enforced. It also creates problems for CAs that share validation services with TLS and have already stopped logging it. Section 5.4.1 (2.ii): Effective March 15, 2027, audit logs of verification activities must include: the information validated; the domain name whose control was validated, if different from the domain portion of the Mailbox Address (e.g., the Authorization Domain Name or SMTP FQDN); the validation method used. Together with the time and date that 5.4.1 already requires, this is enough to tell which requirements applied to a validation. Section 1.2.1: Adds revision and compliance date rows. The ballot number and publication date are placeholders. Differences from SC-099 Uses “domain name whose control was validated” instead of “ADN”, because ADN is not defined in the SBR and S/MIME also covers SMTP FQDN validation (3.2.2.3). The method can refer to a section of either the SBR or the TLS BR, because 3.2.2.1 and 3.2.2.3 rely on TLS BR 3.2.2.4.

Network and Certificate System Security Requirements
Version 2.0.5 (Ballot NS-008) - Jul 9, 2025

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The Certification Authority Browser Forum (CA/Browser Forum) is a voluntary gathering of Certificate Issuers and suppliers of Internet browser software and other applications that use certificates (Certificate Consumers).