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Ballot SC061v4: New CRL Entries must have a Revocation Reason Code

Voting Results

Certificate Issuers 24 votes total, with no abstentions:

  • 24 Issuers voting YES: iTrusChina, HARICA, Telia, D-Trust, Digicert, Entrust, OISTE, NAVER Cloud, eMudhra, GlobalSign, Fastly, Chunghwa Telecom, SwissSign, SECOM, Buypass, VikingCloud, JPRS, Disig, GDCA, Izenpe, CFCA, Certum, Goddaddy, Let’s Encrypt
  • 0 Issuers voting NO
  • 0 Issuers ABSTAIN

Certificate Consumers 3 votes total, with no abstentions:

  • 3 Consumers voting YES: Microsoft, Google, Mozilla
  • 0 Consumers voting NO
  • 0 Consumers ABSTAIN

Bylaws Requirements

  1. Bylaw 2.3(6) requires:
  • In order for a ballot to be adopted by the Forum, two‐thirds (2/3) or more of the votes cast by the Voting Members in the Certificate Issuer category must be in favour of the ballot. This requirement was MET.
  • at least fifty percent (50%) plus one (1) of the votes cast by the Voting Members in the Certificate Consumer category must be in favour of the ballot. This requirement was MET.
  • At least one (1) Voting Member in each category must vote in favour of a ballot for the ballot to be adopted. This requirement was MET.
  1. Bylaw 2.3(7) requires:
  • A ballot result will be considered valid only when more than half of the number of currently active Voting Members has participated. The number of currently active Voting Members is the average number of Voting Member organizations that have participated in the previous three (3) Forum Meetings and Forum Teleconferences.
  • Half of the currently active members at the start of voting was 13, so the quorum was 14 for this ballot. This requirement was MET.

Ballot Contents

Purpose of Ballot SC-061 v.4 The purpose of this ballot is to modify sections 4.9.1.1 and 7.2.2 of the Baseline Requirements to incorporate the CRL reason codes that Mozilla has adopted in section 6.1.1 of the Mozilla Root Store Policy. The following motion has been proposed by Ben Wilson of Mozilla and endorsed by David Kluge of Google Trust Services and Kiran Tummala of Microsoft.

Motion Begins

This ballot modifies sections 4.9.1.1 and 7.2.2 of the “Baseline Requirements for the Issuance and Management of Publicly-Trusted Certificates” as defined in the following redline, based on Version 1.8.6:

https://github.com/cabforum/servercert/compare/e87bc5fcf35f533e58899311e538e6ffe959102e

Motion Ends

This ballot proposes a Final Maintenance Guideline. The procedure for approval of this ballot is as follows:

Discussion (7+ days)

Start Time: February 8, 2023 03:00 UTC

End Time: Not before February 15, 2023 03:00 UTC

Vote for approval (7 days)

Start Time: February 15, 2023 04:00 UTC

End Time: February 22, 2023 04:00 UTC

Ballot Status

This ballot now enters the IP Rights Review Period to permit members to review the ballot for relevant IP rights issues.

Latest releases
Server Certificate Requirements
SC099: Improve Recording of Validation Methods - May 19, 2026

Code Signing Requirements
v3.8 - Aug 5, 2024

What’s Changed CSC-25: Import EV Guidelines to CS Baseline Requirements by @dzacharo in https://github.com/cabforum/code-signing/pull/38 Full Changelog: https://github.com/cabforum/code-signing/compare/v3.7...v3.8

S/MIME Requirements
v1.0.14 - Ballot SMC016 - May 5, 2026

This ballot maintains consistency between the S/MIME Baseline Requirements and the TLS Baseline Requirements with changes introduced by Ballots SC096 and SC097. Specifically, this ballot: Creates a carve-out of the logging requirements for DNSSEC specifically, stating these are not in scope. For audit purposes, change management logging is able to confirm if the appropriate controls are in effect or not. Sunsets all remaining use of SHA-1 signatures in Certificates and CRLs. It is noted that most uses of SHA-1 signatures are already deprecated by SC097. With this ballot, all unexpired Subordinate CA Certificates issuing S/MIME containing the SHA-1 signature algorithm must be revoked. This proposal does not prohibit the use of SHA-1 to generate issuerKeyHash or issuerNameHash values as currently required by RFC 5019. Includes minor formatting corrections.

Network and Certificate System Security Requirements
Version 2.0.5 (Ballot NS-008) - Jul 9, 2025

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The Certification Authority Browser Forum (CA/Browser Forum) is a voluntary gathering of Certificate Issuers and suppliers of Internet browser software and other applications that use certificates (Certificate Consumers).