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2022-08-02 Minutes of the Network Security Working Group

CA/Browser Forum NetSec Meeting

Attendance

  • Aaron Poulsen – Amazon
  • Amanda Mendieta – Apple
  • Chris Kemmerer – SSL.com{.}
  • Clint Wilson – Apple
  • Corey Bonnell – Digicert
  • Corey Rasmussen – OATI
  • David Kluge – Google
  • Dustin Hollenback – Microsoft
  • Inigo Barreira – Sectigo
  • Jozef Nigut – Disig
  • Kiran Tummala – Microsoft
  • Michelle Coon – OATI
  • Pedro Fuentes – OISTE Foundation
  • Prachi Jain – Fastly
  • Rebecca Kelley – Apple
  • Tony Seymour – Comsign

Minutes

  1. Read Antitrust Statement
  • Clint Wilson Read the antitrust statement
  1. Roll Call
  • Clint Wilson took attendance
  1. Review Agenda
  • Approved minutes from previous meeting

No discussion topics were raised.

David Kluge provided an update on the ongoing Threat Assessment work.

Latest releases
Server Certificate Requirements
SC095v3: Clean-up 2025 - Apr 2, 2026

Code Signing Requirements
v3.8 - Aug 5, 2024

What’s Changed CSC-25: Import EV Guidelines to CS Baseline Requirements by @dzacharo in https://github.com/cabforum/code-signing/pull/38 Full Changelog: https://github.com/cabforum/code-signing/compare/v3.7...v3.8

S/MIME Requirements
v1.0.14 - Ballot SMC016 - May 5, 2026

This ballot maintains consistency between the S/MIME Baseline Requirements and the TLS Baseline Requirements with changes introduced by Ballots SC096 and SC097. Specifically, this ballot: Creates a carve-out of the logging requirements for DNSSEC specifically, stating these are not in scope. For audit purposes, change management logging is able to confirm if the appropriate controls are in effect or not. Sunsets all remaining use of SHA-1 signatures in Certificates and CRLs. It is noted that most uses of SHA-1 signatures are already deprecated by SC097. With this ballot, all unexpired Subordinate CA Certificates issuing S/MIME containing the SHA-1 signature algorithm must be revoked. This proposal does not prohibit the use of SHA-1 to generate issuerKeyHash or issuerNameHash values as currently required by RFC 5019. Includes minor formatting corrections.

Network and Certificate System Security Requirements
Version 2.0.5 (Ballot NS-008) - Jul 9, 2025

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The Certification Authority Browser Forum (CA/Browser Forum) is a voluntary gathering of Certificate Issuers and suppliers of Internet browser software and other applications that use certificates (Certificate Consumers).