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2022-07-28 Minutes of the Code Signing Certificate Working Group

Attendees

Andrea Holland (SecureTrust), Atsushi Inaba (GlobalSign), Bruce Morton (Entrust), Dean Coclin (DigiCert), Joanna Fox (TrustCor), Martijn Katerbarg (Sectigo), Michael Sykes (SSL.com), Mohit Kumar (GlobalSign), Tim Crawford (CPA Canada/WebTrust)

Minutes

Antitrust Statement: Read by Dean Coclin

Minute Taker: Tim Crawford

No comments on minutes from 7/14/2022, minutes approved

Welcome back Bruce

Membership

Visa has applied as an interested party. It was noted Visa is a CAB Forum member and an agreement is in place. No issues were noted with this application, and it was approved.

Signing Service

Bruce is looking to turn the reformatted document into a ballot for review. Bruce would like Ian (Microsoft) to review the ballot during our next call in two weeks. Bruce does not believe any current ballots will impact the current state of the signing service ballot.

Time Stamping

Three or four items have been discussed, but waiting on Ian (Microsoft) to make a proposal

Malware update

Currently waiting on comments from Tim H (DigiCert), and the proposal is good to move forward once those comments are received.

Next meeting 8/11 – At this meeting we will include further discussion on Time stamping.

Latest releases

Server Certificate Requirements
SC099: Improve Recording of Validation Methods - May 19, 2026

Code Signing Requirements
v3.8 - Aug 5, 2024

What’s Changed CSC-25: Import EV Guidelines to CS Baseline Requirements by @dzacharo in https://github.com/cabforum/code-signing/pull/38 Full Changelog: https://github.com/cabforum/code-signing/compare/v3.7...v3.8

S/MIME Requirements
v1.0.14 - Ballot SMC016 - May 5, 2026

This ballot maintains consistency between the S/MIME Baseline Requirements and the TLS Baseline Requirements with changes introduced by Ballots SC096 and SC097. Specifically, this ballot: Creates a carve-out of the logging requirements for DNSSEC specifically, stating these are not in scope. For audit purposes, change management logging is able to confirm if the appropriate controls are in effect or not. Sunsets all remaining use of SHA-1 signatures in Certificates and CRLs. It is noted that most uses of SHA-1 signatures are already deprecated by SC097. With this ballot, all unexpired Subordinate CA Certificates issuing S/MIME containing the SHA-1 signature algorithm must be revoked. This proposal does not prohibit the use of SHA-1 to generate issuerKeyHash or issuerNameHash values as currently required by RFC 5019. Includes minor formatting corrections.

Network and Certificate System Security Requirements
Version 2.0.5 (Ballot NS-008) - Jul 9, 2025