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2022-07-14 Minutes of the Code Signing Certificate Working Group

Attendees

Atsushi Inaba, Corey Bonnell, Dean Coclin, Inigo Barreira, Janet Hines, Joanna Fox, Michael Sykes, Roberto Quinones, Tim Crawford, and Tim Hollebeek

Minutes

Minute Taker: Janet

Antitrust statement was read by Dean Coclin

Approved minutes from June 30, 2022 meeting

Signing service discussion

No additional discussion – Waiting on Bruce to get back.

Timestamping

Corey will work on a draft ballot for the Pandoc typographical errors. We will need further discussion before we begin a draft ballot on timestamping.

Malware proposal

June 27th proposal Inigo provided a basic summary: limit number of days, removing the OCSP log analysis requirements, and simplify the process. Plan to provide feedback on the next call.

Other Business

Dean reminded us to sign up for the face-to-face meeting in October to assist our host with planning.

Next meeting is July 28, 2022, Meeting was adjourned

Latest releases
Server Certificate Requirements
SC095v3: Clean-up 2025 - Apr 2, 2026

Code Signing Requirements
v3.8 - Aug 5, 2024

What’s Changed CSC-25: Import EV Guidelines to CS Baseline Requirements by @dzacharo in https://github.com/cabforum/code-signing/pull/38 Full Changelog: https://github.com/cabforum/code-signing/compare/v3.7...v3.8

S/MIME Requirements
v1.0.14 - Ballot SMC016 - May 5, 2026

This ballot maintains consistency between the S/MIME Baseline Requirements and the TLS Baseline Requirements with changes introduced by Ballots SC096 and SC097. Specifically, this ballot: Creates a carve-out of the logging requirements for DNSSEC specifically, stating these are not in scope. For audit purposes, change management logging is able to confirm if the appropriate controls are in effect or not. Sunsets all remaining use of SHA-1 signatures in Certificates and CRLs. It is noted that most uses of SHA-1 signatures are already deprecated by SC097. With this ballot, all unexpired Subordinate CA Certificates issuing S/MIME containing the SHA-1 signature algorithm must be revoked. This proposal does not prohibit the use of SHA-1 to generate issuerKeyHash or issuerNameHash values as currently required by RFC 5019. Includes minor formatting corrections.

Network and Certificate System Security Requirements
Version 2.0.5 (Ballot NS-008) - Jul 9, 2025

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The Certification Authority Browser Forum (CA/Browser Forum) is a voluntary gathering of Certificate Issuers and suppliers of Internet browser software and other applications that use certificates (Certificate Consumers).