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2022-07-14 Minutes of the Code Signing Certificate Working Group

Attendees

Atsushi Inaba, Corey Bonnell, Dean Coclin, Inigo Barreira, Janet Hines, Joanna Fox, Michael Sykes, Roberto Quinones, Tim Crawford, and Tim Hollebeek

Minutes

Minute Taker: Janet

Antitrust statement was read by Dean Coclin

Approved minutes from June 30, 2022 meeting

Signing service discussion

No additional discussion – Waiting on Bruce to get back.

Timestamping

Corey will work on a draft ballot for the Pandoc typographical errors. We will need further discussion before we begin a draft ballot on timestamping.

Malware proposal

June 27th proposal Inigo provided a basic summary: limit number of days, removing the OCSP log analysis requirements, and simplify the process. Plan to provide feedback on the next call.

Other Business

Dean reminded us to sign up for the face-to-face meeting in October to assist our host with planning.

Next meeting is July 28, 2022, Meeting was adjourned

Latest releases
Server Certificate Requirements
SC100: DNSSEC Clarification and Consolidation - Sep 7, 2026

Code Signing Requirements
v3.8 - Aug 5, 2024

What’s Changed CSC-25: Import EV Guidelines to CS Baseline Requirements by @dzacharo in https://github.com/cabforum/code-signing/pull/38 Full Changelog: https://github.com/cabforum/code-signing/compare/v3.7...v3.8

S/MIME Requirements
v1.0.17 - Ballot SMC020 - Nov 20, 2026

Addresses https://github.com/cabforum/smime/issues/308. Aligns the S/MIME BR with TLS BR Ballot SC-099. Changes Section 3.2.2: Removes the requirement to record the validation method “including the relevant version number” from the TLS BR or S/MIME BR. This version number is unclear and can’t be enforced. It also creates problems for CAs that share validation services with TLS and have already stopped logging it. Section 5.4.1 (2.ii): Effective March 15, 2027, audit logs of verification activities must include: the information validated; the domain name whose control was validated, if different from the domain portion of the Mailbox Address (e.g., the Authorization Domain Name or SMTP FQDN); the validation method used. Together with the time and date that 5.4.1 already requires, this is enough to tell which requirements applied to a validation. Section 1.2.1: Adds revision and compliance date rows. The ballot number and publication date are placeholders. Differences from SC-099 Uses “domain name whose control was validated” instead of “ADN”, because ADN is not defined in the SBR and S/MIME also covers SMTP FQDN validation (3.2.2.3). The method can refer to a section of either the SBR or the TLS BR, because 3.2.2.1 and 3.2.2.3 rely on TLS BR 3.2.2.4.

Network and Certificate System Security Requirements
Version 2.0.5 (Ballot NS-008) - Jul 9, 2025

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The Certification Authority Browser Forum (CA/Browser Forum) is a voluntary gathering of Certificate Issuers and suppliers of Internet browser software and other applications that use certificates (Certificate Consumers).