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Ballot SC53: Sunset for SHA-1 OCSP Signing

Voting Results

The voting on ballot SC53 has completed, and the ballot has passed.

Certificate Issuers

21 votes total, with no abstentions:

  • 21 Yes votes: Buypass, Certigna (DHIMYOTIS), Certum (Asseco), Chunghwa Telecom, D-TRUST, DigiCert, Disig, eMudhra, Entrust, Firmaprofesional, GDCA, GlobalSign, GoDaddy, HARICA, Izenpe, JPRS, Let’s Encrypt / ISRG, OISTE, Sectigo, TrustCor, SecureTrust
  • 0 No Votes
  • 0 Abstentions

Certificate Consumers

5 votes total, with no abstentions:

  • 5 Yes votes: Apple, Cisco, Google, Microsoft, Mozilla
  • 0 No votes
  • 0 Abstentions

Bylaw Requirements

  1. Bylaw 2.3(f) requires:
  • A “yes” vote by two-thirds of Certificate Issuer votes and by 50%-plus-one of Certificate Consumer votes. Votes to abstain are not counted for this purpose. This requirement was MET for Certificate Issuers and MET for Certificate Consumers.
  • At least one Certificate Issuer and one Certificate Consumer Member must vote in favor of a ballot for the ballot to be adopted. This requirement was MET.
  1. Bylaw 2.3(g) requires that a ballot result only be considered valid when “more than half of the number of currently active Members has participated”. Votes to abstain are counted in determining quorum. Half of the currently active members at the start of voting was 14, so the quorum was 15 for this ballot. This requirement was MET.

Ballot Contents

Purpose of Ballot

Weaknesses regarding the use of the SHA-1 hash algorithm for signatures have been known for several years. While there is currently a prohibition on the use of CA Private Keys to directly sign OCSP responses using SHA-1, Private Keys corresponding to OCSP delegated responders may still be used to sign OCSP responses using SHA-1. This ballot establishes a sunset date to prohibit delegated OCSP signing with the SHA-1 hash algorithm.

The following motion has been proposed by Corey Bonnell of DigiCert and endorsed by Ben Wilson of Mozilla and Bruce Morton of Entrust.

Motion Begins

This ballot modifies the “Baseline Requirements for the Issuance and Management of Publicly-Trusted Certificates” (“Baseline Requirements”), based on Version 1.8.0: MODIFY the Baseline Requirements as specified in the following Redline:

https://github.com/cabforum/servercert/compare/cda0f92ee70121fd5d692685b97ebb6669c74fb7…637c6959c35bbd93cc451f7b22dfb48ac4255b9f

Motion Ends

This ballot proposes a Final Maintenance Guideline. The procedure for approval of this ballot is as follows:

Discussion (7+ days)

Start time: 2022-01-10 15:00:00 UTC

End time: 2022-01-17 15:00:00 UTC

Vote for approval (7 days)

Start time: 2022-01-17 15:00:00 UTC

End time: 2022-01-24 15:00:00 UTC

Ballot Status

This ballot has cleared the IP Rights Review period with no IP Rights issues raised by the community. It has therefore been incorporated in to the Baseline Requirements as version 1.8.2.

Latest releases
Code Signing Requirements
v3.8 - Aug 5, 2024

What’s Changed CSC-25: Import EV Guidelines to CS Baseline Requirements by @dzacharo in https://github.com/cabforum/code-signing/pull/38 Full Changelog: https://github.com/cabforum/code-signing/compare/v3.7...v3.8

S/MIME Requirements
v1.0.7 - Ballot SMC09 - Nov 25, 2024

This ballot includes updates for the following: • Require pre-linting of leaf end entity Certificates starting September 15, 2025 • Require WebTrust for Network Security for audits starting after April 1, 2025 • Clarify that multiple certificatePolicy OIDs are allowed in end entity certificates • Clarify use of organizationIdentifer references • Update of Appendix A.2 Natural Person Identifiers This ballot is proposed by Stephen Davidson (DigiCert) and endorsed by Clint Wilson (Apple) and Martijn Katerbarg (Sectigo).

Network and Certificate System Security Requirements
v2.0 - Ballot NS-003 - Jun 26, 2024

Ballot NS-003: Restructure the NCSSRs in https://github.com/cabforum/netsec/pull/35

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The Certification Authority Browser Forum (CA/Browser Forum) is a voluntary gathering of Certificate Issuers and suppliers of Internet browser software and other applications that use certificates (Certificate Consumers).