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Ballot CSC-12 – CRL Revocation Date Clarification

Results of IPR Review

(Mailing list post is available here.)

The review period has ended and no exclusion notices were filed.

The final documents, with the effective date being 2021-12-03, are available here.

Results of Voting

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YesNoAbstain
Certificate IssuersCertum (Asseco), DigiCert, Entrust, E-TUGRA, GlobalSign, HARICA, Sectigo, SSL.com
Certificate ConsumersMicrosoft

The ballot has PASSED.

Purpose of the Ballot

While RFC 5280, section 5.3.2 specifies that it is best practice to include the Invalidity Date CRL entry extension to denote when a certificate first became invalid, Certificate Consumer software commonly ignores this extension in favor of using the time encoded in the CRL entry revocationDate field for this purpose. This ballot clarifies that CAs shall use the revocationDate to denote when a certificate first became invalid even if that time precedes issuance of the latest CRL. Additionally, this ballot clarifies that if the CA is becomes aware of a more appropriate revocation date for a revoked Code Signing Certificate, then the CA may include this date in subsequently issued CRLs and OCSP responses pertaining to that revoked Code Signing Certificate.

Motion

This ballot updates the “Baseline Requirements for the Issuance and Management of Publicly‐Trusted Code Signing Certificates” version 2.5 according to the attached redline which includes:

  • Add the effective date of the CRL profile change in section 1.3.
  • Modification of the third paragraph of section 13.2.1.
  • Addition of two paragraphs after the third paragraph of section 13.2.1.
  • Add explanatory footnote to the bottom of the last page of section 13.2.1.
Latest releases
Server Certificate Requirements
SC100: DNSSEC Clarification and Consolidation - Sep 7, 2026

Code Signing Requirements
v3.8 - Aug 5, 2024

What’s Changed CSC-25: Import EV Guidelines to CS Baseline Requirements by @dzacharo in https://github.com/cabforum/code-signing/pull/38 Full Changelog: https://github.com/cabforum/code-signing/compare/v3.7...v3.8

S/MIME Requirements
v1.0.17 - Ballot SMC020 - Nov 20, 2026

Addresses https://github.com/cabforum/smime/issues/308. Aligns the S/MIME BR with TLS BR Ballot SC-099. Changes Section 3.2.2: Removes the requirement to record the validation method “including the relevant version number” from the TLS BR or S/MIME BR. This version number is unclear and can’t be enforced. It also creates problems for CAs that share validation services with TLS and have already stopped logging it. Section 5.4.1 (2.ii): Effective March 15, 2027, audit logs of verification activities must include: the information validated; the domain name whose control was validated, if different from the domain portion of the Mailbox Address (e.g., the Authorization Domain Name or SMTP FQDN); the validation method used. Together with the time and date that 5.4.1 already requires, this is enough to tell which requirements applied to a validation. Section 1.2.1: Adds revision and compliance date rows. The ballot number and publication date are placeholders. Differences from SC-099 Uses “domain name whose control was validated” instead of “ADN”, because ADN is not defined in the SBR and S/MIME also covers SMTP FQDN validation (3.2.2.3). The method can refer to a section of either the SBR or the TLS BR, because 3.2.2.1 and 3.2.2.3 rely on TLS BR 3.2.2.4.

Network and Certificate System Security Requirements
Version 2.0.5 (Ballot NS-008) - Jul 9, 2025

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The Certification Authority Browser Forum (CA/Browser Forum) is a voluntary gathering of Certificate Issuers and suppliers of Internet browser software and other applications that use certificates (Certificate Consumers).