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Ballot CSC-12 – CRL Revocation Date Clarification

Results of IPR Review

(Mailing list post is available here.)

The review period has ended and no exclusion notices were filed.

The final documents, with the effective date being 2021-12-03, are available here.

Results of Voting

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YesNoAbstain
Certificate IssuersCertum (Asseco), DigiCert, Entrust, E-TUGRA, GlobalSign, HARICA, Sectigo, SSL.com
Certificate ConsumersMicrosoft

The ballot has PASSED.

Purpose of the Ballot

While RFC 5280, section 5.3.2 specifies that it is best practice to include the Invalidity Date CRL entry extension to denote when a certificate first became invalid, Certificate Consumer software commonly ignores this extension in favor of using the time encoded in the CRL entry revocationDate field for this purpose. This ballot clarifies that CAs shall use the revocationDate to denote when a certificate first became invalid even if that time precedes issuance of the latest CRL. Additionally, this ballot clarifies that if the CA is becomes aware of a more appropriate revocation date for a revoked Code Signing Certificate, then the CA may include this date in subsequently issued CRLs and OCSP responses pertaining to that revoked Code Signing Certificate.

Motion

This ballot updates the “Baseline Requirements for the Issuance and Management of Publicly‐Trusted Code Signing Certificates” version 2.5 according to the attached redline which includes:

  • Add the effective date of the CRL profile change in section 1.3.
  • Modification of the third paragraph of section 13.2.1.
  • Addition of two paragraphs after the third paragraph of section 13.2.1.
  • Add explanatory footnote to the bottom of the last page of section 13.2.1.
Latest releases
Server Certificate Requirements
BRs/2.1.2 SC-080 V3: Sunset the use of WHOIS to identify Domain Contacts and relying DCV Methods - Dec 16, 2024

Ballot SC-080 V3: “Sunset the use of WHOIS to identify Domain Contact… (https://github.com/cabforum/servercert/pull/560) Ballot SC-080 V3: “Sunset the use of WHOIS to identify Domain Contacts and relying DCV Methods” (https://github.com/cabforum/servercert/pull/555)

Code Signing Requirements
v3.8 - Aug 5, 2024

What’s Changed CSC-25: Import EV Guidelines to CS Baseline Requirements by @dzacharo in https://github.com/cabforum/code-signing/pull/38 Full Changelog: https://github.com/cabforum/code-signing/compare/v3.7...v3.8

S/MIME Requirements
v1.0.8 - Ballot SMC010 - Dec 23, 2024

This ballot adopts Multi-Perspective Issuance Corroboration (MPIC) for CAs when conducting Email Domain Control Validation (DCV) and Certification Authority Authorization (CAA) checks for S/MIME Certificates. The Ballot adopts the MPIC implementation consistent with the TLS Baseline Requirements. Acknowledging that some S/MIME CAs with no TLS operations may require additional time to deploy MPIC, the Ballot has a Compliance Date of May 15, 2025. Following that date the implementation timeline described in TLS BR section 3.2.2.9 applies. This ballot is proposed by Stephen Davidson (DigiCert) and endorsed by Ashish Dhiman (GlobalSign) and Nicolas Lidzborski (Google).

Network and Certificate System Security Requirements
v2.0 - Ballot NS-003 - Jun 26, 2024

Ballot NS-003: Restructure the NCSSRs in https://github.com/cabforum/netsec/pull/35

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The Certification Authority Browser Forum (CA/Browser Forum) is a voluntary gathering of Certificate Issuers and suppliers of Internet browser software and other applications that use certificates (Certificate Consumers).