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Ballot CSC-9 – Spring 2021 Cleanup and Clarification

IPR Review Results

The review period has ended and no exclusion notices were filed.

The final documents, with the effective date being 9 September 2021, are available here.

Voting Results

Voting on Ballot CSC-9 has concluded and the ballot has passed. Below are the results:

CAs voting in favor: Actalis, Certum (Asseco), DigiCert, eMudhra, Entrust, GlobalSign, HARICA, Sectigo, SSL.com, SecureTrust

CAs opposed: None CAs abstaining: None

Certificate Consumers:

In Favor: Microsoft

Opposed: None

Abstaining: None

The Chair instructs the Vice Chair to create the guideline as voted.

Dean Coclin

CSCWG Chair

Purpose of this ballot

Cleanup and clarify requirements in the Baseline Requirement for the Issuance and Management of Publicly-Trusted Code Signing Certificates v2.3.

The following motion has been proposed by Bruce Morton, and endorsed by Ian McMillan of Microsoft and Corey Bonnell of DigiCert.

Motion begins

This ballot modifies the “Baseline Requirements for the Issuance and Management of Publicly‐Trusted Code Signing Certificates“ version 2.3 according to the following redline.

Baseline Requirements for the Issuance and Management of Code Signing Ballot CSC-9

Motion ends

The procedure for approval of this ballot is as follows:

Discussion (7 days) Start Time: 2021-07-20, 11:30 Eastern Time (US) End Time: not before 2021-07-27, 11:30 Eastern Time (US)

Vote for approval (7 days) Start Time:

Latest releases

Server Certificate Requirements
SC095v3: Clean-up 2025 - Apr 2, 2026

Code Signing Requirements
v3.8 - Aug 5, 2024

What’s Changed CSC-25: Import EV Guidelines to CS Baseline Requirements by @dzacharo in https://github.com/cabforum/code-signing/pull/38 Full Changelog: https://github.com/cabforum/code-signing/compare/v3.7...v3.8

S/MIME Requirements
v1.0.14 - Ballot SMC016 - May 5, 2026

This ballot maintains consistency between the S/MIME Baseline Requirements and the TLS Baseline Requirements with changes introduced by Ballots SC096 and SC097. Specifically, this ballot: Creates a carve-out of the logging requirements for DNSSEC specifically, stating these are not in scope. For audit purposes, change management logging is able to confirm if the appropriate controls are in effect or not. Sunsets all remaining use of SHA-1 signatures in Certificates and CRLs. It is noted that most uses of SHA-1 signatures are already deprecated by SC097. With this ballot, all unexpired Subordinate CA Certificates issuing S/MIME containing the SHA-1 signature algorithm must be revoked. This proposal does not prohibit the use of SHA-1 to generate issuerKeyHash or issuerNameHash values as currently required by RFC 5019. Includes minor formatting corrections.

Network and Certificate System Security Requirements
Version 2.0.5 (Ballot NS-008) - Jul 9, 2025