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Ballot SC048v2: Domain Name and IP Address Encoding

The voting on ballot SC48 v2 has completed, and the ballot has passed.

Voting Results

Certificate Issuers

14 votes total, with one abstention

· 13 Yes votes: DigiCert, eMudhra, Entrust, Firmaprofesional, GDCA, GlobalSign, HARICA, Izenpe, OISTE, Sectigo, SSL.com, SwissSign, SecureTrust

· 0 No Votes

· 1 Abstention: JPRS

Certificate Consumers

3 votes total, with no abstentions

· 3 Yes votes: Apple, Google, Microsoft

· 0 No votes

· 0 Abstentions

Bylaw Requirements

  1. Bylaw 2.3(f) requires:

o A “yes” vote by two-thirds of Certificate Issuer votes and by 50%-plus-one of Certificate Consumer votes. Votes to abstain are not counted for this purpose. This requirement was MET for Certificate Issuers and MET for Certificate Consumers.

o at least one Certificate Issuer and one Certificate Consumer Member must vote in favor of a ballot for the ballot to be adopted. This requirement was MET.

  1. Bylaw 2.3(g) requires that a ballot result only be considered valid when “more than half of the number of currently active Members has participated”. Votes to abstain are counted in determining quorum. Half of the currently active members at the start of voting was 14, so the quorum was 15 for this ballot. This requirement was MET.

This ballot now enters the IP Rights Review Period to permit members to review the ballot for relevant IP rights issues.

Purpose of Ballot

Ballot 202 set out to clarify requirements regarding encoding of domain names and IP addresses in Subscriber Certificates, but the Ballot ultimately failed to pass. Since then, there have been numerous differences in interpretation of the written requirements.

This Ballot seeks to resolve these differences in interpretation and to provide unambiguous guidance on the correct encoding of domain names and IP addresses in Subscriber Certificates.

The following motion has been proposed by Corey Bonnell of DigiCert and endorsed by Ryan Sleevi of Google and Dimitris Zacharopoulos of HARICA.

Motion Begins

This ballot modifies the “Baseline Requirements for the Issuance and Management of Publicly-Trusted Certificates” (“Baseline Requirements”), based on Version 1.7.6:

MODIFY the Baseline Requirements as specified in the following Redline:

https://github.com/cabforum/servercert/compare/cf4e17a43977dcf7cb9c9e41efd2df4be4707e13…e51b5cfbd1dfcf571523a4597c70a1395c508450

This ballot modifies the “Guidelines for the Issuance and Management of Extended Validation Certificates” (“EV Guidelines”) as follows, based on Version 1.7.6:

MODIFY the EV Guidelines as defined in the following redline:

https://github.com/cabforum/servercert/compare/cf4e17a43977dcf7cb9c9e41efd2df4be4707e13…e51b5cfbd1dfcf571523a4597c70a1395c508450

Motion Ends

This ballot proposes a Final Maintenance Guideline.

The procedure for approval of this ballot is as follows:

Discussion (7+ days)

Start Time: 2021-07-08 15:00:00 UTC

End Time: 2021-07-15 15:00:00 UTC

Vote for approval (7 days)

Start Time: 2021-07-15 15:00:00 UTC

End Time: 2021-07-22 15:00:00 UTC

Latest releases
Server Certificate Requirements
SC100: DNSSEC Clarification and Consolidation - Sep 7, 2026

Code Signing Requirements
v3.8 - Aug 5, 2024

What’s Changed CSC-25: Import EV Guidelines to CS Baseline Requirements by @dzacharo in https://github.com/cabforum/code-signing/pull/38 Full Changelog: https://github.com/cabforum/code-signing/compare/v3.7...v3.8

S/MIME Requirements
v1.0.17 - Ballot SMC020 - Nov 20, 2026

Addresses https://github.com/cabforum/smime/issues/308. Aligns the S/MIME BR with TLS BR Ballot SC-099. Changes Section 3.2.2: Removes the requirement to record the validation method “including the relevant version number” from the TLS BR or S/MIME BR. This version number is unclear and can’t be enforced. It also creates problems for CAs that share validation services with TLS and have already stopped logging it. Section 5.4.1 (2.ii): Effective March 15, 2027, audit logs of verification activities must include: the information validated; the domain name whose control was validated, if different from the domain portion of the Mailbox Address (e.g., the Authorization Domain Name or SMTP FQDN); the validation method used. Together with the time and date that 5.4.1 already requires, this is enough to tell which requirements applied to a validation. Section 1.2.1: Adds revision and compliance date rows. The ballot number and publication date are placeholders. Differences from SC-099 Uses “domain name whose control was validated” instead of “ADN”, because ADN is not defined in the SBR and S/MIME also covers SMTP FQDN validation (3.2.2.3). The method can refer to a section of either the SBR or the TLS BR, because 3.2.2.1 and 3.2.2.3 rely on TLS BR 3.2.2.4.

Network and Certificate System Security Requirements
Version 2.0.5 (Ballot NS-008) - Jul 9, 2025

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