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Ballot SC043: Clarify Acceptable Status Codes

The voting on SC43v2 has completed, and the ballot has failed.

Voting Results

Certificate Issuers

8 votes total, with no abstentions

· 0 Yes votes:

· 8 No Votes: DigiCert, Entrust, GlobalSign, HARICA, Let’s Encrypt / ISRG, Telia Company, TrustCor, SecureTrust

· 0 Abstentions

Certificate Consumers

1 vote total, with no abstentions

  1. 0 Yes votes

  2. 1 No votes: Google

  3. 0 Abstentions

Bylaw Requirements

  1. Bylaw 2.3(f) requires:

o A “yes” vote by two-thirds of Certificate Issuer votes and by 50%-plus-one of Certificate Consumer votes. Votes to abstain are not counted for this purpose. This requirement was NOT met for Certificate Issuers and NOT met for Certificate Consumers.

o at least one Certificate Issuer and one Certificate Consumer Member must vote in favor of a ballot for the ballot to be adopted. This requirement was NOT met.

  1. Bylaw 2.3(g) requires that a ballot result only be considered valid when “more than half of the number of currently active Members has participated”. Votes to abstain are counted in determining quorum. Half of the currently active members at the start of voting was 12, so the quorum was 13 for this ballot. This requirement was NOT met.

This ballot is marked as failed and may be revised and submitted as a new ballot at a future date. The results of this voting will be posted to the public website.


Purpose of Ballot:

This ballot clarifies the allowed HTTP status codes used for following redirects in domain validation methods 18 and 19, and specifies that the target URI must come from the Location response header. In Section 3.2.2.4.18 and 3.2.2.4.19, it replaces “Redirects MUST be the result of an HTTP status code result within the 3xx Redirection class of status codes, as defined in RFC 7231, Section 6.4.” with the following:

  • “Redirects MUST be the result of a 301, 302, 307, or 308 HTTP status code response.”
  • “Redirects MUST be to resource URLs contained in the Location HTTP response header.”

The following motion has been proposed by Niko Carpenter of SecureTrust and endorsed by Corey Bonnell of DigiCert and Ryan Sleevi of Google.

–MOTION BEGINS–

This ballot modifies the “Baseline Requirements for the Issuance and Management of Publicly-Trusted Certificates” as defined in the following redline, based on Version 1.7.3:

https://github.com/cabforum/servercert/compare/2b7720f7821764f0ea9d0d583ec5c61896a3f4cd..bd7915249a0360a28fe37b785c367d70645c7e8f

–MOTION ENDS–

This ballot proposes a Final Maintenance Guideline.

The procedure for approval of this ballot is as follows:

Discussion (7+ days)

Start Time: 11-March 2021 21:30 UTC

End Time: 01-April 2021 16:00 UTC

Vote for approval (7 days)

Start Time: 01-April 2021 16:00 UTC

End Time: 08-April 2021 16:00 UTC

Latest releases
Server Certificate Requirements
SC100: DNSSEC Clarification and Consolidation - Sep 7, 2026

Code Signing Requirements
v3.8 - Aug 5, 2024

What’s Changed CSC-25: Import EV Guidelines to CS Baseline Requirements by @dzacharo in https://github.com/cabforum/code-signing/pull/38 Full Changelog: https://github.com/cabforum/code-signing/compare/v3.7...v3.8

S/MIME Requirements
v1.0.17 - Ballot SMC020 - Nov 20, 2026

Addresses https://github.com/cabforum/smime/issues/308. Aligns the S/MIME BR with TLS BR Ballot SC-099. Changes Section 3.2.2: Removes the requirement to record the validation method “including the relevant version number” from the TLS BR or S/MIME BR. This version number is unclear and can’t be enforced. It also creates problems for CAs that share validation services with TLS and have already stopped logging it. Section 5.4.1 (2.ii): Effective March 15, 2027, audit logs of verification activities must include: the information validated; the domain name whose control was validated, if different from the domain portion of the Mailbox Address (e.g., the Authorization Domain Name or SMTP FQDN); the validation method used. Together with the time and date that 5.4.1 already requires, this is enough to tell which requirements applied to a validation. Section 1.2.1: Adds revision and compliance date rows. The ballot number and publication date are placeholders. Differences from SC-099 Uses “domain name whose control was validated” instead of “ADN”, because ADN is not defined in the SBR and S/MIME also covers SMTP FQDN validation (3.2.2.3). The method can refer to a section of either the SBR or the TLS BR, because 3.2.2.1 and 3.2.2.3 rely on TLS BR 3.2.2.4.

Network and Certificate System Security Requirements
Version 2.0.5 (Ballot NS-008) - Jul 9, 2025

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