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Ballot CSCWG-3: Election of Code Signing Certificate Working Group Chair

Ballot Results

Voting on Ballot CSCWG-3 has ended and the results are below:

Certificate Issuers

Votes in Favor: (9) Actalis, DigiCert, eMudhra, Entrust, GDCA, GlobalSign, HARICA, SSL.com, SecureTrust (former Trustwave)

Votes opposed: None

Abstentions: None

Certificate Consumers

Votes in Favor: (1) Microsoft

Votes Opposed: None

Abstentions: None

Therefore the Ballot passes.

Ballot Content

The following motion has been proposed by the Code Signing Certificate Working Group Chair Dean Coclin of DigiCert.

Purpose of Ballot

This special ballot is to confirm the new Chair of the Code Signing Certificate Working Group.

Motion begins

In accordance with Bylaw 4.1(c), Dean Coclin representing DigiCert is hereby elected Chair of the Code Signing Certificate Working Group for a term commencing on November 1, 2020 and continuing through October 31, 2022.

Motion ends

Latest releases
Server Certificate Requirements
SC095v3: Clean-up 2025 - Apr 2, 2026

Code Signing Requirements
v3.8 - Aug 5, 2024

What’s Changed CSC-25: Import EV Guidelines to CS Baseline Requirements by @dzacharo in https://github.com/cabforum/code-signing/pull/38 Full Changelog: https://github.com/cabforum/code-signing/compare/v3.7...v3.8

S/MIME Requirements
v1.0.14 - Ballot SMC016 - May 5, 2026

This ballot maintains consistency between the S/MIME Baseline Requirements and the TLS Baseline Requirements with changes introduced by Ballots SC096 and SC097. Specifically, this ballot: Creates a carve-out of the logging requirements for DNSSEC specifically, stating these are not in scope. For audit purposes, change management logging is able to confirm if the appropriate controls are in effect or not. Sunsets all remaining use of SHA-1 signatures in Certificates and CRLs. It is noted that most uses of SHA-1 signatures are already deprecated by SC097. With this ballot, all unexpired Subordinate CA Certificates issuing S/MIME containing the SHA-1 signature algorithm must be revoked. This proposal does not prohibit the use of SHA-1 to generate issuerKeyHash or issuerNameHash values as currently required by RFC 5019. Includes minor formatting corrections.

Network and Certificate System Security Requirements
Version 2.0.5 (Ballot NS-008) - Jul 9, 2025

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The Certification Authority Browser Forum (CA/Browser Forum) is a voluntary gathering of Certificate Issuers and suppliers of Internet browser software and other applications that use certificates (Certificate Consumers).