CA/Browser Forum
Home » Posts » 2020-08-19 Minutes of the S/MIME Certificate Working Group

2020-08-19 Minutes of the S/MIME Certificate Working Group

Minutes of SMCWG

August 19, 2020

These are the Approved Minutes of the Teleconference described in the subject of this message. Corrections and clarifications where needed are encouraged by reply.

Attendees

Matthias Wiedenhorst (ACAB’c), Arno Fiedler (Arno Fiedler), Mads Henriksveen (BuyPass), Qiu Dawei (CFCA), Zhang Danmeng (CFCA), Li-Chun Chen (Chunghwa Telecom), Tsung-Min Kuo (Chunghwa Telecom), Andreas Henschel (D-TRUST), Tim Hollebeek (DigiCert), Dean Coclin (DigiCert), Bruce Morton (Entrust DataCard), Wendy Brown (Federal PKI), Thomas Connelly (Federal PKI), Doug Beattie (GlobalSign), Hugh Mercer (GlobalSign), Atsushi Inaba (GlobalSign), Hongquan Yin (Microsoft), Hazhar Ismail (MSC Trustgate.com Sdn Bhd), Ahmad Syafiq Md Zaini (MSC Trustgate.com Sdn Bhd), Fakrul Radzi (MSC Trustgate.com Sdn Bhd), Nazmi Abd Hadi (MSC Trustgate.com Sdn Bhd), Pedro Fuentes (OISTE), Rich Smith (Sectigo), Robin Alden (Sectigo), Tim Callan (Sectigo), Markus Wichmann (TeleTrust), Morad Abou Nasser (TeleTrust), Neil Dunbar (TrustCor), Corey Bonnell (Trustwave), Russ Housley (Vigil Security, LLC), Burkhard Wiegel (Zertificon), Peggy Hüpenbecker (Zertificon), Mevre Tunca (Zertificon)

1. Roll Call

The Roll Call was taken.

2. Read Antitrust Statement

The Antitrust/Compliance Statement was read.

3. Review Agenda

Dean Coclin proposed a change in membership status (see below).

4. Approval of minutes from last teleconference

The minutes of the August 5 teleconference were approved with an update to the attendance list.

5. Approval of New Members

The declarations of the following were noted:

  • Certificate Consumer: Zertificon
  • Interested Party: Nathalie Weiler

Their membership in the SMCWG was accepted by consensus. In addition, Dean Coclin clarified the status of current Associate Member MSC Trustgate.com Sdn Bhd as being eligible as a Certificate Issuer. A change in membership status was accepted by consensus. As such, the current membership of the SMCWG is:

  • Certificate Issuers: Actalis, Asseco Data Systems (Certum), BuyPass, CFCA, Chunghwa Telecom, Comsign, DigiCert, D-TRUST, eMudhra, Entrust DataCard, GDCA, GlobalSign, HARICA, iTrusChina, MSC Trustgate.com, Sectigo, SHECA, SSC, SSL.com, SwissSign, TrustCor, Trustwave, TWCA, OISTE Foundation
  • Certificate Consumers: Microsoft, Mozilla/Thunderbird, Zertificon
  • Associate Members: ACAB Council, U.S. Federal PKI, WebTrust
  • Interested Parties: Arno Fiedler, PSW, TeleTrusT, Vigil Security, Nathalie Weiler

6. Discussion of approach and deliverables

It was agreed to begin a discussion of certificate profiles starting at the S/MIME end entity, working up the chain, in comparison to major requirements and standards. The worksheet currently includes aspects of standards from Mozilla, Gmail and the US Federal PKI (thanks for Wendy Brown’s assistance):

https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/1gEq-o4jU1FWvKBeMoncfmhAUemAgGuvVRSLQb7PedLU/edit?usp=sharing

Certificate Issuers were asked to review their profiles for variance from these settings for discussion, with feedback preferred on the public list.

Certificate Consumers were requested if there are technical requirements (must have/can’t have) imposed by their products or services on certificates.

Ben Wilson was requested to check the profile against the Mozilla program requirements.

Pertaining to Serial Number, it was discussed whether the requirement for 64 unpredictable bits was a legacy of the SHA1 deprecation or a necessary ongoing security feature. It is a requirement of the Mozilla Root Store Policy 5.2.

Pertaining to Signature Algorithm, assistance was requested in either obtaining an English translation of BSI TR-03166 or in translating the text from German (with particular interest in the use of RSASSA-PSS). It was noted that ECDSA SHA-512 is not supported under Mozilla, with the question if the same applies to Thunderbird.

Pertaining to Validity Period, there was discussion relating to the tradeoffs between shorter validity for crypto agility as championed in TLS, the use of tokens found in many S/MIME implementations, and in use cases such as email gateways. It was proposed that domain certificates would benefit from a separate profile. Discussion to be continued.

6. Any Other Business

Again, WG members are encouraged to submit relevant standards and requirements to the public list.

7. Next call

The next call will take place on September 2, 2020 at 11:00am Eastern Time.

Adjourned

Latest releases
Code Signing Requirements
v3.8 - Aug 5, 2024

What’s Changed

Full Changelog: https://github.com/cabforum/code-signing/compare/v3.7...v3.8

S/MIME Requirements
v1.0.6 - Ballot SMC08 - Aug 29, 2024

This ballot sets a date by which issuance of certificates following the Legacy generation profiles must cease. It also includes the following minor updates:

  • Pins the domain validation procedures to v 2.0.5 of the TLS Baseline Requirements while the ballot activity for multi-perspective validation is concluded, and the SMCWG determines its corresponding course of action;
  • Updates the reference for SmtpUTF8Mailbox from RFC 8398 to RFC 9598; and
  • Small text corrections in the Reference section

Network and Certificate System Security Requirements
v2.0 - Ballot NS-003 - Jun 26, 2024

Ballot NS-003: Restructure the NCSSRs in https://github.com/cabforum/netsec/pull/35

Edit this page
The Certification Authority Browser Forum (CA/Browser Forum) is a voluntary gathering of Certificate Issuers and suppliers of Internet browser software and other applications that use certificates (Certificate Consumers).