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2020-04-16 Minutes of the Server Certificate Working Group

Roll call: Arno Fiedler (D-TRUST), Ben Wilson (Mozilla), Bruce Morton (Entrust Datacard), Clint Wilson (Apple), Corey Bonnell (SecureTrust), Chris Kemmerer (SSL.com), Daniela Hood (GoDaddy), Dean Coclin (Digicert), Doug Beattie (GlobalSign), Dustin Hollenback (Microsoft), Enrico Entschew (D-TRUST), Inaba Atsushi (GlobalSign), Janet Hines (SecureTrust), Joanna Fox (GoDaddy), Jos Purvis (Cisco Systems), Li-Chun Chen (Chunghwa Telecom), Michael Guenther (SwissSign), Michelle Coon (OATI), Mike Reilly (Microsoft), Neil Dunbar (TrustCor Systems), Niko Carpenter (SecureTrust), Patrick Nohe (GlobalSign), Pedro Fuentes (OISTE Foundation), Peter Miskovic (Disig), Rich Smith (Sectigo), Robin Alden (Sectigo), Ryan Sleevi (Google), Shelley Brewer (Digicert), Stephen Davidson (Quo Vadis), Thanos Vrachnos (SSL.com), Tim Callan (Sectigo), Tim Hollebeek (Digicert), Timo Schmitt (SwissSign), Tobias Josefowitz (Opera Software AS), Trevoli Ponds-White (Amazon), Wayne Thayer (Mozilla), Wendy Brown (US Federal PKI Management Authority), Taconis Lewis (US Federal PKI Management Authority), Andrea Holland (SecureTrust).

Agenda approved, anti-trust statement was read, roll was taken.

Minute taker: Tim Hollebeek.

Tobi volunteered to take minutes in two weeks.

Previous minutes were approved.

Validation subcommittee discussed two things:

  1. Voluntary disclosure of information sources

– a few other CAs said they were going to disclose after DigiCert, but haven’t

– CAs are still encouraged to disclosed, but voluntary doesn’t seem to be working

Ryan has a ballot to mandate disclosure

Discussion about the challenges of not having disclosure block issuance of certificates

Ryan posted a really good summary of the discussion to the mailing list, please read it there

  1. Discussed the reorganization of requirements for certificate profiles

Draft skeleton certificate profile wasn’t up until shortly before the meeting, so not much

substantive discussion

Discussing continues on the list and in a Google document

Skeleton will again be reviewed on the next Validation call

NetSec subcommittee:

Discussing SC29 version 3 on the list

Minutes are up for review

SC28 (reducing log retention) is nearly complete

Another ballot (no number yet) for account deactivation

Ballot to replace secure zones and high security zones and replace with clearer structure

Dean: are you intending to start voting on SC29 next week?

Neil: are we allowing ballots due to the covid situation?

Wayne: I’d suggest putting a feeler out and seeing if people are ready to move forward

Ballot status:

Discussion period: SC29 (see above)

Voting period: None

Review period: SC26 (pandoc-friendly markdown changes) – ends Apr 30

Draft ballots:

Ryan – BR alignment

Ryan – Spring cleanup

Ryan – Data source disclosure (discussed on last week’s Validation call)

Chris Kemmerer – updated 6.1.1.3 to clarify requirements around rejecting weak keysServer Certificate Working Group adjourns

Latest releases
Server Certificate Requirements
SC100: DNSSEC Clarification and Consolidation - Sep 7, 2026

Code Signing Requirements
v3.8 - Aug 5, 2024

What’s Changed CSC-25: Import EV Guidelines to CS Baseline Requirements by @dzacharo in https://github.com/cabforum/code-signing/pull/38 Full Changelog: https://github.com/cabforum/code-signing/compare/v3.7...v3.8

S/MIME Requirements
v1.0.17 - Ballot SMC020 - Nov 20, 2026

Addresses https://github.com/cabforum/smime/issues/308. Aligns the S/MIME BR with TLS BR Ballot SC-099. Changes Section 3.2.2: Removes the requirement to record the validation method “including the relevant version number” from the TLS BR or S/MIME BR. This version number is unclear and can’t be enforced. It also creates problems for CAs that share validation services with TLS and have already stopped logging it. Section 5.4.1 (2.ii): Effective March 15, 2027, audit logs of verification activities must include: the information validated; the domain name whose control was validated, if different from the domain portion of the Mailbox Address (e.g., the Authorization Domain Name or SMTP FQDN); the validation method used. Together with the time and date that 5.4.1 already requires, this is enough to tell which requirements applied to a validation. Section 1.2.1: Adds revision and compliance date rows. The ballot number and publication date are placeholders. Differences from SC-099 Uses “domain name whose control was validated” instead of “ADN”, because ADN is not defined in the SBR and S/MIME also covers SMTP FQDN validation (3.2.2.3). The method can refer to a section of either the SBR or the TLS BR, because 3.2.2.1 and 3.2.2.3 rely on TLS BR 3.2.2.4.

Network and Certificate System Security Requirements
Version 2.0.5 (Ballot NS-008) - Jul 9, 2025

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