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2019-05-30 Minutes of the Server Certificate Working Group

Attendees (in alphabetical order)

Ben Wilson (Digicert), Bruce Morton (Entrust Datacard), Chris Kemmerer (SSL.com), Dean Coclin (Digicert), Devon O’Brien (Google), Dimitris Zacharopoulos (HARICA), Doug Beattie (GlobalSign), Enrico Entschew (D-TRUST), Inaba Atsushi (GlobalSign), India Donald (US Federal PKI Management Authority), Janet Hines (SecureTrust), Jos Purvis (Cisco Systems), Kenneth Myers (US Federal PKI Management Authority), Kirk Hall (Entrust Datacard), Li-Chun Chen (Chunghwa Telecom), Mariusz Kondratowicz (Opera Software AS), Michelle Coon (OATI), Mike Reilly (Microsoft), Peter Miskovic (Disig), Robin Alden (Sectigo), Ryan Sleevi (Google), Shelley Brewer (Digicert), Tim Callan (Sectigo), Tomasz Nowak (Opera Software AS), Trevoli Ponds-White (Amazon).

Minutes

1. Roll Call

The Chair took attendance

2. Read Antitrust Statement

The Antitrust Statement was read

3. Review Agenda

The Agenda was approved.

4. Approval of minutes from previous teleconference

The minutes from the previous teleconference were approved and will be circulated to the public list.

5. Membership application of MSC Trustgate and iTrusChina

MSC Trustgate and iTrusChina were not trusted by a Certificate Consumer of the SCWG so according to the SCWG charter they were granted Associate Membership. The WG designated a period of time of 12 months. Before this time expires, the SCWG will re-examine the associate membership status of these two CAs.

A question was raised about whether these members needed to have applied for inclusion in any Root program. The discussion resulted that this was not a necessary requirement according to the SCWG charter or the Bylaws. In any case, Dimitris confirmed that both of these CAs had applied at least to the Mozilla Root store according to Bugzilla.

6. Validation Subcommittee Update

Doug gave the report. It was a short meeting that didn’t go into a lot of details. It was mostly a preparation of topics for the F2F meeting.

7. NetSec Subcommittee Update

Ben gave the report. The Subcommittee has prepared two ballots (SC20, SC21) that include some improvements to the network security requirements. The SC also prepares a response to Ryan’s comments.

8. Ballot Status

Ballots in Discussion Period

None

Ballots in Voting Period

None

Ballots in Review Period

None

Draft Ballots under Consideration

Improvements for Method 6, website control (Tim H.) No additional comments _ SC20 Ballot (NSR 2): System Configuration Management_ (Ben) No additional comments

SC21 Ballot (NSR 3): Log Integrity Controls (Ben) No additional comments

9. Approval of F2F 47 Agenda

Dimitris went through the Server Certificate Working Group agenda for the next F2F. There were no objections to the current draft agenda.

10. Any Other Business

None.

11. Next call

June 27, 2019 at 11:00 am Eastern Time.

Adjourned

Latest releases
Server Certificate Requirements
SC100: DNSSEC Clarification and Consolidation - Sep 7, 2026

Code Signing Requirements
v3.8 - Aug 5, 2024

What’s Changed CSC-25: Import EV Guidelines to CS Baseline Requirements by @dzacharo in https://github.com/cabforum/code-signing/pull/38 Full Changelog: https://github.com/cabforum/code-signing/compare/v3.7...v3.8

S/MIME Requirements
v1.0.17 - Ballot SMC020 - Nov 20, 2026

Addresses https://github.com/cabforum/smime/issues/308. Aligns the S/MIME BR with TLS BR Ballot SC-099. Changes Section 3.2.2: Removes the requirement to record the validation method “including the relevant version number” from the TLS BR or S/MIME BR. This version number is unclear and can’t be enforced. It also creates problems for CAs that share validation services with TLS and have already stopped logging it. Section 5.4.1 (2.ii): Effective March 15, 2027, audit logs of verification activities must include: the information validated; the domain name whose control was validated, if different from the domain portion of the Mailbox Address (e.g., the Authorization Domain Name or SMTP FQDN); the validation method used. Together with the time and date that 5.4.1 already requires, this is enough to tell which requirements applied to a validation. Section 1.2.1: Adds revision and compliance date rows. The ballot number and publication date are placeholders. Differences from SC-099 Uses “domain name whose control was validated” instead of “ADN”, because ADN is not defined in the SBR and S/MIME also covers SMTP FQDN validation (3.2.2.3). The method can refer to a section of either the SBR or the TLS BR, because 3.2.2.1 and 3.2.2.3 rely on TLS BR 3.2.2.4.

Network and Certificate System Security Requirements
Version 2.0.5 (Ballot NS-008) - Jul 9, 2025

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