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Ballot 185 – Limiting the Lifetime of Certificates

Results on Ballot 185

The voting period for Ballot 185 has ended. Here are the results.

Voting by CAs – 25 votes total plus abstentions

  • 1 Yes vote: Let’s Encrypt

  • 24 No votes: DigiCert, Entrust, AS Sertifitseerimiskeskus, Izenpe, ANF Autoridad de Certificación, Comodo, Certinomis, HARICA, GlobalSign, Quo Vadis, GoDaddy, Actalis, Symantec, Trustwave, CFCA, Secom, TWCA, GDCA, Certum, OATI, Buypass, SHECA, CNNIC, Cisco

  • 3 Abstain: Logius PKI, SwissSign, Chunghwa Telecom

4% of CAs voted in favor

Voting by browsers – 4 votes total plus abstentions

  • 2 Yes votes: Google, Mozilla

  • 2 No votes: Microsoft, Qihoo 360

  • 1 Abstain: Apple

50% of browsers voted in favor

Under Bylaw 2.2(g), a ballot result will be considered valid only when more than half of the number of currently active Members has participated. Half of currently active Members is 10, so quorum was 11 votes – quorum was met.

Bylaw 2.2(f) requires a yes vote by two-thirds of CA votes and 50%-plus-one browser votes for approval. This requirement was not met for either CAs or browsers. At least one CA Member and one browser Member must vote in favor of a ballot for the ballot to be adopted. This requirement was met

Accordingly, the ballot fails.

Ballot 185 – Limiting the Lifetime of Certificates

The following motion has been proposed by Ryan Sleevi of Google, Inc and endorsed by Josh Aas of ISRG and Gervase Markham of Mozilla to introduce new Final Maintenance Guidelines for the “Baseline Requirements Certificate Policy for the Issuance and Management of Publicly-Trusted Certificates” and the “Guidelines for the Issuance and Management of Extended Validation Certificates”

Motion begins

Modify Section 6.3.2 of the “Baseline Requirements Certificate Policy for the Issuance and Management of Publicly-Trusted Certificates” as follows:

Replace Section 6.3.2, which reads as follows: “”” 6.3.2. Certificate Operational Periods and Key Pair Usage Periods

Subscriber Certificates issued after the Effective Date MUST have a Validity Period no greater than 60 months. Except as provided for below, Subscriber Certificates issued after 1 April 2015 MUST have a Validity Period no greater than 39 months.

Until 30 June 2016, CAs MAY continue to issue Subscriber Certificates with a Validity Period greater than 39 months but not greater than 60 months provided that the CA documents that the Certificate is for a system or software that: (a) was in use prior to the Effective Date; (b) is currently in use by either the Applicant or a substantial number of Relying Parties; (c) fails to operate if the Validity Period is shorter than 60 months; (d) does not contain known security risks to Relying Parties; and (e) is difficult to patch or replace without substantial economic outlay “””

with the following text: “”” 6.3.2. Certificate Operational Periods and Key Pair Usage Periods

Subscriber Certificates issued on or after 24 August 2017 MUST NOT have a Validity Period greater than three hundred and ninety-eight (398) days.

Subscriber Certificates issued prior to 24 August 2017 MUST NOT have a Validity Period greater than thirty-nine (39) months. “””

Modify Section 9.4 of the “Guidelines for the Issuance and Management of Extended Validation Certificates” as follows:

Replace Section 9.4, which reads as follows: “”” 9.4. Maximum Validity Period For EV Certificate

The validity period for an EV Certificate SHALL NOT exceed twenty seven months. It is RECOMMENDED that EV Subscriber Certificates have a maximum validity period of twelve months. “””

with the following text: “””” 9.4 Maximum Validity Period for EV Certificate

EV Certificates issued on or after 24 August 2017 MUST NOT have a Validity Period greater than three hundred and ninety-eight (398) days.

EV Certificates issued prior to 24 August 2017 MUST NOT have a Validity Period greater than twenty seven (27) months. “””

Motion ends

Ballot 185 – Limiting the Lifetime of Certificates Status: Final Maintenance Guideline

Review Period: Start Time: 2017-02-10 00:00:00 UTC End Time: 2017-02-17 00:00:00 UTC

Vote for Approval: Start Time: 2017-02-17 00:00:00 UTC End Time: 2017-02-24 00:00:00 UTC

Votes must be cast by posting an on-list reply to this thread on the Public Mail List.

A vote in favor of the ballot must indicate a clear ‘yes’ in the response. A vote against must indicate a clear ‘no’ in the response. A vote to abstain must indicate a clear ‘abstain’ in the response. Unclear responses will not be counted. The latest vote received from any representative of a voting Member before the close of the voting period will be counted. Voting Members are listed here: /about/membership/members/

In order for the ballot to be adopted, two thirds or more of the votes cast by Members in the CA category and greater than 50% of the votes cast by members in the browser category must be in favor.

Latest releases
Code Signing Requirements
v3.8 - Aug 5, 2024

What’s Changed CSC-25: Import EV Guidelines to CS Baseline Requirements by @dzacharo in https://github.com/cabforum/code-signing/pull/38 Full Changelog: https://github.com/cabforum/code-signing/compare/v3.7...v3.8

S/MIME Requirements
v1.0.7 - Ballot SMC09 - Nov 25, 2024

This ballot includes updates for the following: • Require pre-linting of leaf end entity Certificates starting September 15, 2025 • Require WebTrust for Network Security for audits starting after April 1, 2025 • Clarify that multiple certificatePolicy OIDs are allowed in end entity certificates • Clarify use of organizationIdentifer references • Update of Appendix A.2 Natural Person Identifiers This ballot is proposed by Stephen Davidson (DigiCert) and endorsed by Clint Wilson (Apple) and Martijn Katerbarg (Sectigo).

Network and Certificate System Security Requirements
v2.0 - Ballot NS-003 - Jun 26, 2024

Ballot NS-003: Restructure the NCSSRs in https://github.com/cabforum/netsec/pull/35

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The Certification Authority Browser Forum (CA/Browser Forum) is a voluntary gathering of Certificate Issuers and suppliers of Internet browser software and other applications that use certificates (Certificate Consumers).