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Ballot 161 – Notification of incorrect issuance

Voting on Ballot 161 closed on 12 February 2016. The results are as follows:

From the CAs, there were 0 YES votes, 14 NO votes and 5 Abstentions

From the Browsers, there were 3 YES votes, 0 NO votes and 0 Abstentions.

Therefore, the ballot fails. Detailed voting results can be found on the ballot tracker: https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/1FBsMZjlzyvK3mFR1u4qMqvZwlI86yJ-v0am1pCBo8uI/edit#gid=4

Ballot 161 – Notification of incorrect issuance

Based on extensive discussions in the forum, Sigbjørn Vik from Opera proposes the following ballot, endorsed by Ryan Sleevi from Google and Gervase Markham from Mozilla.

Motion begins

The following text is added as a sub-section to section 2.2 of the Baseline Requirements:

2.2.1 Notification of incorrect issuance

In the event that a CA issues a certificate in violation of these requirements, the CA SHALL publicly disclose a report within one week of becoming aware of the violation. A link to the report SHALL simultaneously be sent to incidents@cabforum.org.

Effective 01-Jul-16, the CA SHALL in its Certificate Policy and/or Certification Practice Statement announce where such reports will be found. The location SHALL be as accessible as the CP/CPS.

The report SHALL publicize details about what the error was, what caused the error, time of issuance and discovery, and public certificates for all issuer certificates in the trust chain.

The report SHALL publicize the full public certificate, with the following exception: For certificates issued prior to 01-Mar-16 the report MAY truncate Subject Distinguished Name fields and subjectAltName extension values to the registerable domain name.

The report SHALL be made available to the CAs Qualified Auditor for the next Audit Report.

Motion ends

The review period for this ballot shall commence at 2300 UTC on 29 January 2016, and will close at 2300 UTC on 5 February 2016. Unless the motion is withdrawn during the review period, the voting period will start immediately thereafter and will close at 2300 UTC on 12 February 2016. Votes must be cast by posting an on-list reply to this thread.

A vote in favor of the motion must indicate a clear ‘yes’ in the response. A vote against must indicate a clear ‘no’ in the response. A vote to abstain must indicate a clear ‘abstain’ in the response. Unclear responses will not be counted. The latest vote received from any representative of a voting member before the close of the voting period will be counted. Voting members are listed here: /about/members/

In order for the motion to be adopted, two thirds or more of the votes cast by members in the CA category and greater than 50% of the votes cast by members in the browser category must be in favor. Quorum is currently nine (9) members– at least nine members must participate in the ballot, either by voting in favor, voting against, or abstaining.

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The Certification Authority Browser Forum (CA/Browser Forum) is a voluntary gathering of Certificate Issuers and suppliers of Internet browser software and other applications that use certificates (Certificate Consumers).