Home » All CA/Browser Forum Posts » CA/B Forum Releases Code Signing Baseline Requirements – Final Draft for Public Exposure

CA/B Forum Releases Code Signing Baseline Requirements – Final Draft for Public Exposure

The Code Signing Working Group of the CA/Browser Forum announces the final draft of the Code Signing Baseline Requirements. This version takes into account comments received in the first round of public review as well as comments from WebTrust auditors. Additional changes/corrections were incorporated by the working group over the past 3 months. Baseline requirements for codesigning – Feb 4 2015 This version is being sent out to the public mailing list and will be posted on the CA/B Forum website for final comments until March 6th, 2015.

Comments should be sent to: questions@cabforum.org.

If there are no further comments, the group plans to propose a ballot to the CA/B Forum in mid-March to approve the Baseline Requirements. The team wishes to thank the following companies/organizations for participating in the working group: CACert Comodo Digicert Entrust ETSI Federal PKI Firmprofessional Globalsign Intarsys Izenpe Microsoft OTA Alliance Startcom Symantec SwissSign Travelport Trend Micro WebTrust WoSign

From the beginning, we have endeavored to keep the document formation process open and inclusive and we hope everyone feels that this contribution is significant to the improvement of Internet security. Dean Coclin CA/B Forum Chair

Latest releases

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Code Signing Requirements
v3.8 - Aug 5, 2024

What’s Changed CSC-25: Import EV Guidelines to CS Baseline Requirements by @dzacharo in https://github.com/cabforum/code-signing/pull/38 Full Changelog: https://github.com/cabforum/code-signing/compare/v3.7...v3.8

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This ballot maintains consistency between the S/MIME Baseline Requirements and the TLS Baseline Requirements with changes introduced by Ballots SC096 and SC097. Specifically, this ballot: Creates a carve-out of the logging requirements for DNSSEC specifically, stating these are not in scope. For audit purposes, change management logging is able to confirm if the appropriate controls are in effect or not. Sunsets all remaining use of SHA-1 signatures in Certificates and CRLs. It is noted that most uses of SHA-1 signatures are already deprecated by SC097. With this ballot, all unexpired Subordinate CA Certificates issuing S/MIME containing the SHA-1 signature algorithm must be revoked. This proposal does not prohibit the use of SHA-1 to generate issuerKeyHash or issuerNameHash values as currently required by RFC 5019. Includes minor formatting corrections.

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