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Welcome to the CA/Browser Forum

Welcome to the CA/Browser Forum. Organized in 2005, we are a voluntary group of certification authorities (CAs), vendors of Internet browser software, and suppliers of other applications that use X.509 v.3 digital certificates for SSL/TLS and code signing.

The CA/Browser Forum began in 2005 as part of an effort among certification authorities and browser software vendors to provide greater assurance to Internet users about the websites they visit by leveraging the capabilities of SSL/TLS certificates. In June 2007, the CA/Browser Forum adopted version 1.0 of the Extended Validation (EV) Guidelines. EV certificates are issued after extended steps to verify the identity of the entity behind the domain receiving the certificate. Internet browser software displays enhanced indication of that identity by changing the appearance of its display (i.e. colors, icons, animation, and/or additional website information).

Following the publication of version 1.0 of the EV Guidelines, the CA/Browser Forum has continued working to improve the online security of Internet users. The Forum adopted EV Guidelines for issuing code signing certificates, and in 2011 adopted the Baseline Requirements for the Issuance and Management of Publicly-Trusted SSL/TLS Certificates to improve accreditation and approval schemes for all applicants who request that their self-signed root certificates be embedded as trust anchors in software and to extend common standards for issuing SSL/TLS certificates beyond EV to include all Domain-validated (DV) and Organization-Validated (OV) certificates. The Forum also adopted a set of “Network and Certificate System Security Requirements” applicable to all publicly trusted CAs with the intent that all such CAs and Delegated Third Parties be audited for conformity once they have been incorporated as mandatory requirements (if not already mandatory requirements) in browser root programs or existing audit criteria. Currently, the CA/Browser Forum continues work on Internet security issues such as the distribution of digitally signed code, revocation/certificate-validity checking, the domain name system, and other issues of common interest to CAs, Internet software providers, website owners, and Internet users.

Latest releases

Server Certificate Requirements
BRs/2.1.2 SC-080 V3: Sunset the use of WHOIS to identify Domain Contacts and relying DCV Methods - Dec 16, 2024

Ballot SC-080 V3: “Sunset the use of WHOIS to identify Domain Contact… (https://github.com/cabforum/servercert/pull/560) Ballot SC-080 V3: “Sunset the use of WHOIS to identify Domain Contacts and relying DCV Methods” (https://github.com/cabforum/servercert/pull/555)

Code Signing Requirements
v3.8 - Aug 5, 2024

What’s Changed CSC-25: Import EV Guidelines to CS Baseline Requirements by @dzacharo in https://github.com/cabforum/code-signing/pull/38 Full Changelog: https://github.com/cabforum/code-signing/compare/v3.7...v3.8

S/MIME Requirements
v1.0.8 - Ballot SMC010 - Dec 23, 2024

This ballot adopts Multi-Perspective Issuance Corroboration (MPIC) for CAs when conducting Email Domain Control Validation (DCV) and Certification Authority Authorization (CAA) checks for S/MIME Certificates. The Ballot adopts the MPIC implementation consistent with the TLS Baseline Requirements. Acknowledging that some S/MIME CAs with no TLS operations may require additional time to deploy MPIC, the Ballot has a Compliance Date of May 15, 2025. Following that date the implementation timeline described in TLS BR section 3.2.2.9 applies. This ballot is proposed by Stephen Davidson (DigiCert) and endorsed by Ashish Dhiman (GlobalSign) and Nicolas Lidzborski (Google).

Network and Certificate System Security Requirements
v2.0 - Ballot NS-003 - Jun 26, 2024

Ballot NS-003: Restructure the NCSSRs in https://github.com/cabforum/netsec/pull/35