Home » All CA/Browser Forum Posts » Notice of IPR Review Period for BR Amendments Made by Ballots 96, 97, 99, 102 and 105

Notice of IPR Review Period for BR Amendments Made by Ballots 96, 97, 99, 102 and 105

The following changes have been made to the Baseline Requirements since the last Notice of IPR Review Period:

Ballot 96 amended sections 11.1.3 and 11.1.4 dealing with Wildcards and new gTLDs.

Ballot 97 – Prevention of Unknown Certificate Contents – amended section 10.2.3 and Appendix B and also addressed RFC 5280.

Ballot 99 added an allowance for DSA keys to Appendix B

Ballot 102 amended section 9.2.3 concerning the use of domainComponents in certificates.

Finally, the attached redlined version of the Baseline Requirements shows the changes based on Ballot 105, which just passed.

Pursuant to Section 4.1 of the CA/Browser Forum’s IPR Policy, this is notice of the commencement of a 30-day IPR maintenance-guideline review period by which certain provisions of the IPR will become applicable to the above-mentioned changes made to the Baseline Requirements by Ballots 96, 97, 99, 102 and 105. During this IPR review period you are to review these amendments and consider any licensing obligations with respect to any Essential Claims that may be encompassed by such amendments.

The 30-day IPR review period for these changes shall end on 28 August 2013.

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