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Ballot 102 – BR 9.2.3 domainComponent

Ballot 102 – BR 9.2.3 domainComponents (Passed)

Motion

Jeremy Rowley of DigiCert made the following motion, and Robin Alden from Comodo and Geoffrey Keating from Apple endorsed it:

Motion Begins

EFFECTIVE IMMEDIATELY, in order to conform to requirements of other industry bodies, including the Internet Grid Trust Federation, and to allow the encoding of domain components in certificates that interact with the configurations of some LDAP directories, we propose amending Section 9.2.3 of the Baseline Requirements for the Issuance and Management of Publicly-Trusted Certificates as follows:

DELETE

9.2.3 Subject Domain Component Field

Certificate Field: subject:domainComponent (OID 0.9.2342.19200300.100.1.25) Required/Optional: Optional.

Contents: If present, this field MUST contain all components of the subject’s Registered Domain Name in ordered sequence, with the most significant component, closest to the root of the namespace, written last.

and INSERT:

9.2.3 Subject Domain Component Field

Certificate Field: subject:domainComponent (OID 0.9.2342.19200300.100.1.25)

Required/Optional: Optional.

Contents: If present, this field MUST contain a label from a Domain Name.

The domainComponent fields for each Domain Name MUST be in a single ordered sequence containing all labels from the Domain name. The labels MUST be encoded in the reverse order to the on-wire representation of domain names in the DNS protocol, so that the label closest to the root is encoded first.

The CA MUST ensure that the certificate is issued with the consent of, and according to procedures established by, the owner of each Domain Name.

=====Motion Ends=====

The review period for this ballot shall commence at 21:00 UTC on 24 May 2013 and will close at 21:00 UTC on 31 May 2013. Unless the motion is withdrawn during the review period, the voting period will start immediately thereafter and will close at 21:00 UTC on 7 June 2013. Votes must be cast by posting an on-list reply to this thread.

Motion Ends

A vote in favor of the motion must indicate a clear ‘yes’ in the response. A vote against must indicate a clear ‘no’ in the response. A vote to abstain must indicate a clear ‘abstain’ in the response. Unclear responses will not be counted. The latest vote received from any representative of a voting member before the close of the voting period will be counted.

Latest releases
Server Certificate Requirements
SC100: DNSSEC Clarification and Consolidation - Sep 7, 2026

Code Signing Requirements
v3.8 - Aug 5, 2024

What’s Changed CSC-25: Import EV Guidelines to CS Baseline Requirements by @dzacharo in https://github.com/cabforum/code-signing/pull/38 Full Changelog: https://github.com/cabforum/code-signing/compare/v3.7...v3.8

S/MIME Requirements
v1.0.17 - Ballot SMC020 - Nov 20, 2026

Addresses https://github.com/cabforum/smime/issues/308. Aligns the S/MIME BR with TLS BR Ballot SC-099. Changes Section 3.2.2: Removes the requirement to record the validation method “including the relevant version number” from the TLS BR or S/MIME BR. This version number is unclear and can’t be enforced. It also creates problems for CAs that share validation services with TLS and have already stopped logging it. Section 5.4.1 (2.ii): Effective March 15, 2027, audit logs of verification activities must include: the information validated; the domain name whose control was validated, if different from the domain portion of the Mailbox Address (e.g., the Authorization Domain Name or SMTP FQDN); the validation method used. Together with the time and date that 5.4.1 already requires, this is enough to tell which requirements applied to a validation. Section 1.2.1: Adds revision and compliance date rows. The ballot number and publication date are placeholders. Differences from SC-099 Uses “domain name whose control was validated” instead of “ADN”, because ADN is not defined in the SBR and S/MIME also covers SMTP FQDN validation (3.2.2.3). The method can refer to a section of either the SBR or the TLS BR, because 3.2.2.1 and 3.2.2.3 rely on TLS BR 3.2.2.4.

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Version 2.0.5 (Ballot NS-008) - Jul 9, 2025

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