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Ballot 65 – QIIS Definition Update

Ballot 65 – QIIS Definition Update (Passed Unanimously)

Motion

Jeremy Rowley made the following motion, and Rich Smith and Stephen Davidson endorsed it:

Motion begins

Effective immediately:

  • Erratum begins Replace Section 10.10.5 in the EV Guidelines:

A Qualified Independent Information Source (QIIS) is a regularly-updated and current, publicly available, database designed for the purpose of accurately providing the information for which it is consulted, and which is generally recognized as a dependable source of such information. A commercial database is a QIIS if the following are true:

(1) Industry groups rely on the database for providing accurate location or contact information;

(2) The database distinguishes between self-reported data and data reported by independent information sources;

(3) The database provider identifies how frequently they update the information in their database;

(4) Changes in the data that will be relied upon will be reflected in the database in no more than 12 months; and

(5) The database provider uses authoritative sources independent of the Subject, or multiple corroborated sources, to which the data pertains.

Databases in which the CA or its owners or affiliated companies maintain a controlling interest, or in which any Registration Authorities or subcontractors to whom the CA has outsourced any portion of the vetting process (or their owners or affiliated companies) maintain any ownership or beneficial interest do not qualify as a QIIS. The CA MUST check the accuracy of the database and ensure its data is acceptable.

With:

A Qualified Independent Information Source (QIIS) is a regularly-updated and current, publicly available, database designed for the purpose of accurately providing the information for which it is consulted, and which is generally recognized as a dependable source of such information. A commercial database is a QIIS if the following are true:

(1) The database is generally recognized as and relied on by other industries for providing accurate data;

(2) The database distinguishes between self-reported data and data reported by independent information sources;

(3) The database provider identifies how frequently the data is updated;

(4) Changes in the data that will be relied upon will be reflected in the database in no more than 12 months; and

(5) The database provider uses authoritative sources or multiple corroborated sources.

Databases in which the CA or its owners or affiliated companies maintain a controlling interest, or in which any Registration Authorities or subcontractors to whom the CA has outsourced any portion of the vetting process (or their owners or affiliated companies) maintain any ownership or beneficial interest do not qualify as a QIIS. The CA MUST check the accuracy of the database and ensure its data is acceptable.

Erratum Ends

The ballot review period comes into effect at 2100 UTC on 2 Feb ’12 and will close at 2100 UTC on 9 Feb ’12. Unless the motion is withdrawn during the review period, the voting period will start immediately thereafter and will close at 2100 UTC on 16 Feb ’12. Votes must be cast by “reply all” to this email.

Motion Ends

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