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Ballot 32 – Revocation for Well-Known Private Key

Ballot 32 – Revocation for Well-Known Private Key (Passed Unanimously)

Motion

Bruce Morton made the following motion, and Eddy Nigg and Nick Hales endorsed it:

Motion begins

The Guidelines should be amended by the following erratum.

Erratum begins

Delete the following paragraph from Section 27(b)3 of the Guidelines for the Processing of Extended Validation Certificates v1.1:

“The CA obtains reasonable evidence that the Subscriber’s Private Key (corresponding to the Public Key in the EV Certificate) has been compromised, or that the EV Certificate has otherwise been misused;”

Insert the following paragraph:

“The CA obtains reasonable evidence that the Subscriber’s Private Key (corresponding to the Public Key in the EV Certificate) has been compromised or is suspected of compromise (e.g. Debian known weak keys), or that the EV Certificate has otherwise been misused;”

Erratum ends

Motion ends

The ballot review period comes into effect at 2100 UTC on 15 July 09 and will close at 2100 UTC on 22 July 2009. Unless the motion is withdrawn during the review period, the voting period will start immediately thereafter and will close at 2100 UTC on 29 July 2009.

Votes must be cast by ‘reply all’ to this email.

A vote in favour of the motion must indicate a clear ‘yes’ in the response. A vote against must indicate a clear ‘no’ in the response. A vote to abstain must indicate a clear ‘abstain’ in the response. Unclear responses will not be counted.

The latest vote received from any representative of a voting member before the close of the voting period will be counted

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What’s Changed CSC-25: Import EV Guidelines to CS Baseline Requirements by @dzacharo in https://github.com/cabforum/code-signing/pull/38 Full Changelog: https://github.com/cabforum/code-signing/compare/v3.7...v3.8

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This ballot introduces requirements that a CA or RA must follow to rely upon a Mobile Drivers License (mDL) to provide evidence for the authentication of individual identity. It allows the use of mDL that conform to ISO/IEC 18013-5 and which may be verified by the CA or RA in conformance with ISO/IEC 18013-7. The CA or RA shall only accept mDL from an Issuing Authority that is legally authorized by the relevant government or jurisdiction to issue driving licenses. The draft also aligns the subsections of 3.2.4.2 (Validation of individual identity) to correspond more closely with those in 3.2.4.1 (Attribute collection of individual identity). It also includes minor editorial corrections. SMC015v2 was updated to remove an additional reference to the superceded ETSI EN 319 403. This ballot is proposed by Stephen Davidson (DigiCert) and endorsed by Ben Wilson (Mozilla) and Scott Rea (eMudhra).

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