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Ballot 32 – Revocation for Well-Known Private Key

Ballot 32 – Revocation for Well-Known Private Key (Passed Unanimously)

Motion

Bruce Morton made the following motion, and Eddy Nigg and Nick Hales endorsed it:

Motion begins

The Guidelines should be amended by the following erratum.

Erratum begins

Delete the following paragraph from Section 27(b)3 of the Guidelines for the Processing of Extended Validation Certificates v1.1:

“The CA obtains reasonable evidence that the Subscriber’s Private Key (corresponding to the Public Key in the EV Certificate) has been compromised, or that the EV Certificate has otherwise been misused;”

Insert the following paragraph:

“The CA obtains reasonable evidence that the Subscriber’s Private Key (corresponding to the Public Key in the EV Certificate) has been compromised or is suspected of compromise (e.g. Debian known weak keys), or that the EV Certificate has otherwise been misused;”

Erratum ends

Motion ends

The ballot review period comes into effect at 2100 UTC on 15 July 09 and will close at 2100 UTC on 22 July 2009. Unless the motion is withdrawn during the review period, the voting period will start immediately thereafter and will close at 2100 UTC on 29 July 2009.

Votes must be cast by ‘reply all’ to this email.

A vote in favour of the motion must indicate a clear ‘yes’ in the response. A vote against must indicate a clear ‘no’ in the response. A vote to abstain must indicate a clear ‘abstain’ in the response. Unclear responses will not be counted.

The latest vote received from any representative of a voting member before the close of the voting period will be counted

Latest releases
Code Signing Requirements
v3.8 - Aug 5, 2024

What’s Changed CSC-25: Import EV Guidelines to CS Baseline Requirements by @dzacharo in https://github.com/cabforum/code-signing/pull/38 Full Changelog: https://github.com/cabforum/code-signing/compare/v3.7...v3.8

S/MIME Requirements
v1.0.6 - Ballot SMC08 - Aug 29, 2024

This ballot sets a date by which issuance of certificates following the Legacy generation profiles must cease. It also includes the following minor updates: Pins the domain validation procedures to v 2.0.5 of the TLS Baseline Requirements while the ballot activity for multi-perspective validation is concluded, and the SMCWG determines its corresponding course of action; Updates the reference for SmtpUTF8Mailbox from RFC 8398 to RFC 9598; and Small text corrections in the Reference section

Network and Certificate System Security Requirements
v2.0 - Ballot NS-003 - Jun 26, 2024

Ballot NS-003: Restructure the NCSSRs in https://github.com/cabforum/netsec/pull/35

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