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Ballot 27 – Alternatives for Verifying Domain Control

Ballot 27 – Alternatives for Verifying Domain Control (Rejected)

Motion

Steve Roylance made the following motion, and Bruce Morton and Bjørn Vermo endorsed it:

Motion begins

The Guidelines should be amended by the following erratum.

Erratum begins

Replace 18(b)(2)(B): (B) In cases where the registered domain holder cannot be contacted, the CA MUST:

(1) Rely on a Verified Legal Opinion to the effect that Applicant has the exclusive right to use the specified domain name in identifying itself on the Internet, and

(2) Rely on a representation from the Contract Signer, or the Certificate Approver, if expressly so authorized in a mutually-agreed-upon contract, coupled with a practical demonstration by Applicant establishing that it controls the domain name by making an agreed upon change in information found online on a web page identified by a uniform resource identifier containing Applicant’s FQDN;

With: (B) In cases where the registered domain holder cannot be contacted, the CA MUST either:

(1) Rely on a Verified Legal Opinion to the effect that Applicant has the exclusive right to use the specified domain name in identifying itself on the Internet, or

(2) Rely on a representation from the Contract Signer, or the Certificate Approver, if expressly so authorized in a mutually-agreed-upon contract, coupled with a practical demonstration by Applicant establishing that it controls the domain name by making an agreed upon change in information found online on a web page identified by a uniform resource identifier containing Applicant’s FQDN;

Erratum ends

Motion ends

The ballot review period comes into effect at 2100 UTC on 12 May 09 and will close at 2100 UTC on 19 May 2009. Unless the motion is withdrawn during the review period, the voting period will start immediately thereafter and will close at 2100 UTC on 26 May 2009.

Votes must be cast by ‘reply all’ to this email.

A vote in favour of the motion must indicate a clear ‘yes’ in the response. A vote against must indicate a clear ‘no’ in the response. A vote to abstain must indicate a clear ‘abstain’ in the response. Unclear responses will not be counted.

The latest vote received from any representative of a voting member before the close of the voting period will be counted.

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The Certification Authority Browser Forum (CA/Browser Forum) is a voluntary gathering of Certificate Issuers and suppliers of Internet browser software and other applications that use certificates (Certificate Consumers).