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Ballot 22 – RSA 1024 Retirement

Ballot 22 – RSA 1024 Retirement (Unanimously Passed)

Motion

Robin Alden made the following motion, and Steve Medin and Moudrick Dadashov endorsed it.

Motion begins

The Guidelines should be amended in accordance with the following erratum.

Erratum begins

Delete Appendix A and replace it with the following.

Appendix A Minimum Cryptographic Algorithm and Key Sizes

  1. Root CA Certificates
Root Certificates whose validity period begins on or before 31 Dec 2010Root Certificates whose validity period begins after 31 Dec 2010
Digest algorithmMD5 (NOT RECOMMENDED),SHA-1SHA-1*, SHA-256, SHA-384 or SHA-512
RSA2048†2048
ECCNIST P-256NIST P-256
  1. Subordinate CA Certificates
Subordinate CA Certificates whose validity period begins on or before 31 Dec 2010Subordinate CA Certificates whose validity period begins after 31 Dec 2010
Digest algorithmSHA-1SHA-1*, SHA-256, SHA-384 or SHA-512
RSA10242048
ECCNIST P-256NIST P-256
  1. Subscriber Certificates
Subscriber Certificates whose validity period ends on or before 31 Dec 2010Subscriber Certificates whose validity period ends after 31 Dec 2010
Digest algorithmSHA-1SHA1*, SHA-256, SHA-384 or SHA-512
RSA10242048
ECCNIST P-256NIST P-256

† A Subscriber Certificate may, in addition, chain to an EV-enabled <2048-bit key RSA root CA certificate.

  • SHA-1 SHOULD be used only until SHA-256 is supported widely by browsers used by a substantial portion of relying parties worldwide.

Erratum ends

Motion ends

The ballot review period comes into effect at 18.00 EST on Monday 15th December, and will close at 18.00 EST on Monday 22nd December. Unless the motion is withdrawn during the review period, the voting period will start immediately thereafter and will close at 18.00 EST on Monday 29th December.

Votes must be cast by ‘reply all’ to this email.

A vote in favour of the motion must indicate a clear ‘yes’ in the response. A vote against must indicate a clear ‘no’ in the response. A vote to abstain must indicate a clear ‘abstain’ in the response. Unclear responses will not be counted.

The latest vote received from any representative of a voting member before the close of the voting period will be counted.

Latest releases
Server Certificate Requirements
SC099: Improve Recording of Validation Methods - May 19, 2026

Code Signing Requirements
v3.8 - Aug 5, 2024

What’s Changed CSC-25: Import EV Guidelines to CS Baseline Requirements by @dzacharo in https://github.com/cabforum/code-signing/pull/38 Full Changelog: https://github.com/cabforum/code-signing/compare/v3.7...v3.8

S/MIME Requirements
v1.0.14 - Ballot SMC016 - May 5, 2026

This ballot maintains consistency between the S/MIME Baseline Requirements and the TLS Baseline Requirements with changes introduced by Ballots SC096 and SC097. Specifically, this ballot: Creates a carve-out of the logging requirements for DNSSEC specifically, stating these are not in scope. For audit purposes, change management logging is able to confirm if the appropriate controls are in effect or not. Sunsets all remaining use of SHA-1 signatures in Certificates and CRLs. It is noted that most uses of SHA-1 signatures are already deprecated by SC097. With this ballot, all unexpired Subordinate CA Certificates issuing S/MIME containing the SHA-1 signature algorithm must be revoked. This proposal does not prohibit the use of SHA-1 to generate issuerKeyHash or issuerNameHash values as currently required by RFC 5019. Includes minor formatting corrections.

Network and Certificate System Security Requirements
Version 2.0.5 (Ballot NS-008) - Jul 9, 2025

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