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Ballot 19 – Authoritative Time Source

Ballot 19 – Authoritative Time Source (Passed Unanimously)

Motion

Ben Wilson made the following motion, and Peri Drucker and Bjørn Vermo endorsed it.

Motion begins

The Guidelines should be amended in accordance with the following erratum.

Erratum begins

In Appendix I, replace the paragraph that reads “An EV Timestamp Authority MUST be synchronized with a publicly accepted time source in the jurisdiction of its operation, (e.g. NIST or Naval Laboratory in the United States).”

with “An EV Timestamp Authority MUST be synchronized with a UTC(k) time source recognized by the International Bureau of Weights and Measures (BIPM).”

Erratum ends

Motion ends

The ballot review period comes into effect at 1700 EDT on (Friday) 24 Oct 2008, and will close at 1700 EDT on (Friday) 31 Oct 2008. Unless the motion is withdrawn during the review period, the voting period will start immediately thereafter and will close at 1700 EST on (Friday) 7 Nov 2008.

Votes must be cast by ‘reply all’ to this email.

A vote in favour of the motion must indicate a clear ‘yes’ in the response. A vote against must indicate a clear ‘no’ in the response. A vote to abstain must indicate a clear ‘abstain’ in the response. Unclear responses will not be counted.

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v3.8 - Aug 5, 2024

What’s Changed CSC-25: Import EV Guidelines to CS Baseline Requirements by @dzacharo in https://github.com/cabforum/code-signing/pull/38 Full Changelog: https://github.com/cabforum/code-signing/compare/v3.7...v3.8

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