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Ballot 2 – Security Committee

Ballot 2 – Security Committee (Failed Quorum)

Motion

“The CABForum adopts the procedures for a security committee as described in ‘CABForum security committee, draft 2, 2007-06-14’ (as distributed by Gervase Markham on 19 June 2007), for a trial period not to exceed six months. The procedures and the duration of the trial period may be revised by a similar ballot at any time. At the end of the trial period, a review of the effectiveness of the procedures will be conducted. Based upon the results of the review, the procedures will either be confirmed or revised by another ballot similar to this one.”

Voting members should indicate their approval of this motion by a ‘reply all’ to this message with a ‘yes’ response. Disapproval should be indicated by a ‘reply all’ to this message with a ‘no’ response.

Adoption of this motion requires a ‘yes’ response from a simple majority (more than half of those who vote). No more than one vote will be counted from each of the voting member organizations. Here is the list of current voting member organizations.

The ballot will close at 1700 EDT on 29 June 2007.

Latest releases

Server Certificate Requirements
SC095v3: Clean-up 2025 - Apr 2, 2026

Code Signing Requirements
v3.8 - Aug 5, 2024

What’s Changed CSC-25: Import EV Guidelines to CS Baseline Requirements by @dzacharo in https://github.com/cabforum/code-signing/pull/38 Full Changelog: https://github.com/cabforum/code-signing/compare/v3.7...v3.8

S/MIME Requirements
v1.0.14 - Ballot SMC016 - May 5, 2026

This ballot maintains consistency between the S/MIME Baseline Requirements and the TLS Baseline Requirements with changes introduced by Ballots SC096 and SC097. Specifically, this ballot: Creates a carve-out of the logging requirements for DNSSEC specifically, stating these are not in scope. For audit purposes, change management logging is able to confirm if the appropriate controls are in effect or not. Sunsets all remaining use of SHA-1 signatures in Certificates and CRLs. It is noted that most uses of SHA-1 signatures are already deprecated by SC097. With this ballot, all unexpired Subordinate CA Certificates issuing S/MIME containing the SHA-1 signature algorithm must be revoked. This proposal does not prohibit the use of SHA-1 to generate issuerKeyHash or issuerNameHash values as currently required by RFC 5019. Includes minor formatting corrections.

Network and Certificate System Security Requirements
Version 2.0.5 (Ballot NS-008) - Jul 9, 2025