Welcome to the CA/Browser Forum

The Certification Authority Browser Forum (CA/Browser Forum) is a voluntary gathering of Certificate Issuers and suppliers of Internet browser software and other applications that use certificates (Certificate Consumers).

More information for about the forum and information for Site Owners, Developers, Auditors and Assessors, and Potential Members can be found in the About section of this website.

Recent posts

Ballot SC098v2: Process RFC 8657 CAA Parameters
May 13, 2026 by Wayne Thayer

Ballot Server Certificates

Voting Results Certificate Issuers 23 votes in total:

2026-05-07 Minutes of the Server Certificate Working Group
May 7, 2026 by Wayne Thayer

Minutes Server Certificates

Minutes: Meeting Title: CA/Browser Forum SCWG Teleconference Date: 7 May 2026 Chair: Dimitris Zacharopoulos Minutes Taken By: Lynn Jeun 1. Begin Recording - Roll Call Meeting called to order by Dimitris Zacharopoulos.

Ballot SMC017: Increase Minimum RSA CA Key Size
April 29, 2026 by Stephen Davidson

Ballot S/MIME

Ballot SMC017: Increase Minimum RSA CA Key SizeBallot SMC017 was withdrawn on May 12, 2026. Ballot SMC017: Increase Minimum RSA CA Key SizeSummary: This ballot increases the minimum RSA key size for Root and Subordinate CA certificates in the S/MIME BRs from 2048 to 4096 bits for keys created on or after September 15, 2026, while retaining the 2048-bit minimum for Subscriber certificates.

More posts of the CA/Browser Forum

Latest releases

Server Certificate Requirements
SC099: Improve Recording of Validation Methods - May 19, 2026

Code Signing Requirements
v3.8 - Aug 5, 2024

What’s Changed CSC-25: Import EV Guidelines to CS Baseline Requirements by @dzacharo in https://github.com/cabforum/code-signing/pull/38 Full Changelog: https://github.com/cabforum/code-signing/compare/v3.7...v3.8

S/MIME Requirements
v1.0.14 - Ballot SMC016 - May 5, 2026

This ballot maintains consistency between the S/MIME Baseline Requirements and the TLS Baseline Requirements with changes introduced by Ballots SC096 and SC097. Specifically, this ballot: Creates a carve-out of the logging requirements for DNSSEC specifically, stating these are not in scope. For audit purposes, change management logging is able to confirm if the appropriate controls are in effect or not. Sunsets all remaining use of SHA-1 signatures in Certificates and CRLs. It is noted that most uses of SHA-1 signatures are already deprecated by SC097. With this ballot, all unexpired Subordinate CA Certificates issuing S/MIME containing the SHA-1 signature algorithm must be revoked. This proposal does not prohibit the use of SHA-1 to generate issuerKeyHash or issuerNameHash values as currently required by RFC 5019. Includes minor formatting corrections.

Unable to retrieve latest release information from the netsec repository.